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CORNERING THE QUARK: INVESTMENT-BACKED
EXPECTATIONS AND ECONOMICALLY VIABLE USES
IN TAKINGS ANALYSIS
Lynda J. Oswald*
Abstract: Although stressing the "ad hoc, factual" nature of regulatory takings analysis,
the United States Supreme Court has, over time, elevated the prominence of two economic
tests in its analysis. In this Article, the author criticizes the importance placed on the tests and
argues that the validity of a regulation must be determined based on the legitimacy of the
governmental objective and the relationship between that objective and the challenged regu-
lation, and not on the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner. The author
rejects the notion that exercises of the eminent domain power and valid exercises of the police
power anchor separate ends of a single continuum. Rather, the author asserts that a valid
exercise of the police power may deprive a property owner of all economic use of his or her
property, and an exercise of the eminent domain power requiring compensation may leave a
property owner with significant enjoyment of the rights of an owner. Accordingly, the Article
urges a resurrection of police power theories in regulatory takings analysis and a refocusing
on the nature of the governmental power being exercised (police or eminent domain) and the
validity of that exercise.
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Regulatory takings are proving to be one of the enduring legal dilem-
mas of the twentieth century. The question is a simple one: at what point
does a regulation so infringe upon a property interest that compensation
is required by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments?' Despite the exten-
sive attention afforded it by scholars and courts, the question remains
impervious to pat answers or easy analysis. In the wry words of Profes-
sor Charles Haar, the search for a definitive test for regulatory takings is
the "lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark."2 Unfor-
tunately, while physicists have made much progress in recent years in
cornering their elusive prey,3 a definitive, workable test for regulatory
takings4 has evaded capture.
*Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Michigan School of Business Administration.
J.D., M.B.A., A.B., University of Michigan. I gratefully acknowledge the research support of the
University of Michigan School of Business Administration.
1. U.S. Const. amends. V & XIV, § 1. The Fifth Amendment provides "nor shall private property
be taken for public use without just compensation." The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that
this protection is made applicable to the states through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,235-41 (1897).
2. Charles Haar, Land-Use Planning 766 (3d ed. 1976), quoted in Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 199 n.17 (1985).
3. See Lawrence M. Krauss, Fear Of Physics 44,45 (1993).
4. A regulatory taking occurs when the government enacts a law or uadertakes an action that
results in a de facto "taking" of property but does not formally exercise its power of eminent domain.
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Although the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the
"ad hoc, factual" nature of regulatory takings analysis,' over time the
Court has come to identify factors relevant to the inquiry. Prominent
among these factors are two economic tests: the investment-backed
expectations test, articulated in 1978 in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York,6 and the "economically viable use" test, set forth in
1980 inAgins v. City of Tiburon.7
The Supreme Court has created and developed these two economic
tests within a relatively small universe of cases: twenty-one Supreme
Court decisions make reference to "investment-backed expectations;"'
sixteen cases refer to "economically viable use[s]," "economically bene-
ficial use[s]," or "economically feasible use[s]." 9 The true set of cases is
5. Although the Supreme Court apparently first used this phrase in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), the Court has reiterated it in virtually every takings case
since then. However, the notions that regulatory takings cases defy the application of any "set
formula," Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962), and that case-specific
determinations are required, United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958),
certainly predate Penn Central.
6. 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978).
7. 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980).
8. Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2291
(1993); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 n.8 (1992); Nordlinger v.
Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2333 n.4 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 853
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 606 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704,715 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987);
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 349 (1986); Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,226 (1986); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121, 129 n.6 (1985); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 577 (1985);
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985);
United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 107 (1985); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005
(1984); Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83
(1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65
n.21 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
9. The following cases refer to "economically viable use[s]": Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct.
2309, 2316 (1994); Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894; Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 17 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; Riverside, 474 U.S. at
127; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485; Hamilton Bank 473 U.S. at 191 n.12; Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 14;
Virginia Surface, 452 U.S. at 296; Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981);
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,647 (1981); Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
The following cases refer to "economically beneficial use(s]": Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 n.6;
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 114 S. Ct. 1332, 1334 (1994) (cert. denied, Scalia, J., dissenting),
Concrete Pipe, 113 S. Ct. at 2290; Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893; MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477
U.S. at 360 (White, J., dissenting); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314,335 (1981).
The following cases refer to "economically feasible use[s]": MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477
U.S. at 362 (White, J., dissenting); Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. at 191.
Washington Law Review
even smaller than these numbers would indicate, as some cases fall in
both categories," and other cases make only tangential or inconsequen-
tial references to either of the two tests." From the remaining small
body of case law has arisen a line of takings jurisprudence that focuses
primarily on economic considerations and that defies rational or coherent
classification or analysis."
The appeal of the investment-backed expectations and economically
viable use tests lies in their apparent simplicity.' 3 Instead of focusing on
the complex issue of the legitimacy of the governmental objective at
stake, and the relationship between that objective arnd the challenged
regulation, 4 the Court can, by using one of these two tests, focus almost
exclusively on the economic effect of the regulation upon the property
owner. Thus, the investment-backed expectations and economically
viable use tests provide the Court with a surrogate fbr a true takings
analysis, a surrogate that allows the Court to avoid the more difficult
questions associated with regulations alleged to be takings. While this
shorthand analysis may be conceptually easier to apply in the simpler
cases, it ultimately proves unsatisfying in the more difficult ones.
Part I of this Article looks at the historical antecedents of the invest-
ment-backed expectations and the economically viable use tests and
examines the inherent ambiguities of each of the economic tests. Part II
rejects the economic tests as the proper standard for .avaluating regula-
tory takings claims. Because the economic tests focus on the wrong
issue-the economic impact of the regulation upon the property owner,
rather than the regulation's effect upon constitutionally protected prop-
erty rights-they can (and often do) lead to incorrect outcomes in takings
cases.
10. See supra notes 8-9.
11. See, e.g., Thomas, 473 U.S. at 577; Locke, 471 U.S. at 87, 107; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S.
314, 335 (1981); Schad, 452 U.S. at 68.
12. The Supreme Court has articulated a third economic factor as well: the economic impact of
the regulation upon the property owner. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. However, this test
has not played a prominent role in recent Supreme Court analysis, see Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2886
(analyzing regulatory takings primarily in terms of investment-backed expectations and
economically viable use), and appears to have been subsumed in the economically viable use test and
the diminution in value test. See infra note 41 (discussing the diminution in value test); Andrea L.
Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I - A Critique of Current
Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1301, 1325 (1989).
13. I say "apparent" because, as the following analysis indicates, close examination reveals that
the tests are rife with landmines.
14. See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text (discussing test for evaluating validity of
police power regulations).
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I propose that the economic tests be relegated to their proper role as
one of several factors to be considered in determining whether a regula-
tion takes private property in contravention of the Constitution. In Part
H, I urge the resurrection of existing but long-ignored police power"s and
eminent domain theories 6 and a restructuring of those theories in a new
pattern. Correct analysis of a regulatory takings claim should focus on
the nature of the power being exercised by the government and upon
whether that power is being exercised in a valid manner. I provide a
series of hypotheticals illustrating the fundamental flaws of the economic
tests and the strengths of the revived police power analysis. Part III
contains concluding remarks.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE
ECONOMIC TESTS
Once the Supreme Court held in its 1922 decision in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon that a regulation could, if it goes "too far," effect a
15. The Supreme Court explored the nature and scope of the police power in Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 (1887), where the Court rejected the claim of a beer manufacturer that a legislative
prohibition against the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages constituted a taking of his
property. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, noted that a state has broad powers to regulate
matters of health, safety, and public morals, powers collectively known as the "police power." See
id. at 657-59 (citing Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847)).
Professor Ernst Freund defined the police power as follows:
The state places its corporate and proprietary resources at the disposal of the public by the
establishment of improvements and services of different kinds; and it exercises its compulsory
powers for the prevention and anticipation of wrong by narrowing common law rights through
conventional restraints and positive regulations which are not confined to the prohibition of
wrongful acts. It is this latter kind of state control which constitutes the essence of the police
power.
Ernst Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights 6 (1904) (emphasis
omitted). Exercise of the police power does not require compensation, even if the regulation
infringes upon private property rights. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale
L.J. 36, 46-50 (1964) (arguing that regulations that fall within a state's police power do not require
compensation).
16. Although modem doctrine tends to obfuscate the distinction between the police and eminent
domain powers, they are, in their original conceptions, very different. Freund provided the classic
definition:
Under the police power, rights of property are impaired not because they become useful or
necessary to the public, or because some public advantage can be gained by disregarding them,
but because their free exercise is believed to be detrimental to public interests; it may be said
that the state takes property by eminent domain because it is useful to the public, and under the
police power because it is harmful ....
Freund, supra note 15, at 546-47. For a further discussion of this harm/benefit distinction, see infra
notes 42, 224-28 and accompanying text.
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taking, 7 it was left with the herculean task of identifting the circum-
stances under which such a taking would arise. The Coart has identified
two per se tests for takings; all other cases are decided under ad hoe
rules. The easiest takings cases are those involving peLmanent physical
invasions. These cases fall within the per se test articulated in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,8 which finds a taking whenever
there is a "permanent physical occupation" by the government, regard-
less of how minimal the intrusion or how important the governmental
interest at stake. 9 Physical occupations generally are easy to identify
and unambiguous; thus, application of this test (and resolution of the
takings claim) is usually noncontroversial and certain.2
Cases not involving permanent physical invasions are much more dif-
ficult to resolve. Historically, the Supreme Court has addressed non-
physical takings on a case-by-case basis,2' guided always by notions of
"justice and fairness." The Court attempted to minimize the ad hoe
nature of regulatory takings analysis by announcing a second per se test
in its 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.' The
Court there held that a taking occurs whenever the owner of real property
is "called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name
of the common good,"24 provided that the regulated activity is not a
nuisance-like activity prohibited or constrained at common law.' This
17. 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922) ("The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to
a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
18. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
19. Id. at 426. The Court stated that a permanent physical occupation is :iuch an interference with
the owner's property interests that it constitutes a taking "without regard to whether the action
achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner." Id. at
434-35. See also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946) (holding that physical invasion
of airspace is a taking even though "the owner does not in any physical mtnner occupy that stratum
of airspace or make use of it in the conventional sense").
20. Although the test is easy to apply, commentators have questioned the wisdom of the test itself.
See, e.g., John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisiontal Model for the Taking
Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 465, 523 (1983) (concluding the per se rule for "permanent physical
occupations" should be abandoned).
21. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (stating that determination
of "whether a taking has occurred is essentially an 'ad hoe, factual' inquiry") (citing Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978) (noting that the Supreme Court has been unable to formulate a definitive test for
when a regulatory taking has occurred).
22. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
23. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
24. Id. at 2895 (emphasis in original).
25. Id. at 2900. ('[R]egulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land... cannot be
newly legislated or decreed (without compensation) but must inhere in the title itself, in the
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second per se test focuses upon the economic effect of the disputed
regulation as opposed to the character (physical versus nonphysical inva-
sion) of the contested governmental action.26 As such, it directly impli-
cates the two economic tests that are the subject of this Article.
These two per se tests cover only a very small subset of governmental
actions. Few regulations deprive owners of all use of their property;
fewer still will result in a permanent physical occupation of property.
Most challenged regulations will fall somewhere outside the boundaries
of these tests. In the words of the Court, in evaluating such regulations,
there is "no 'set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking
begins.' Instead, we rely 'as much [on] the exercise of judgment as [on]
the application of logic."' 27
In attempting to create workable rules that would produce rational,
predictable outcomes in these gray cases, the Court has identified several
relevant factors to be considered. Among these are the impact of the
regulation on investment-backed expectations and economically viable
uses. Although the Supreme Court has intimated that the two tests are
analytically distinct,28 in practice the Court has treated them as being
restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place
upon land ownership.").
Although Lucas articulated the per se test for deprivation of all economically viable use most
explicitly, the notion that a complete destruction of economically viable use was a taking had
appeared in earlier cases. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1987); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
652-53 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 149-50 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). The Lucas Court, in fact, treated this second per se test as established precedent. 112 S.
Ct. at 2893 (stating that "(t]he second situation in which we have found categorical treatment
appropriate is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land').
Commentators too had predicted the direction of this doctrinal development several years before
Lucas was handed down. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1622
(1988) (quoted infra at text accompanying note 216).
26. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987), foreshadowed Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lucas in several ways. In particular,
Justice Rehnquist indicated that where the government has physically taken property, the Penn
Central three-factor test (discussed inffra note 65 and accompanying text) is unnecessary as
"[physical appropriation by the government leaves no doubt that it has in fact deprived the owner of
all uses of the land." 480 U.S. at 517 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Rehnquist apparently
viewed Loretto's per se test for physical invasions as simply another variant of the total deprivation
of economically viable use scenario.
27. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1986) (alterations in
original) (citations omitted).
28. For example, the Court repeatedly lists the two tests as separate factors to be considered in a
takings inquiry. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
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overlapping, although not identical.29 In addition, while the Court has
indicated that the "economically viable use" test of Agins applies in the
context of a facial challenge to regulations" and the Penn Central invest-
ment-backed expectations test applies in the case of an "as applied"
challenge,3 the Court has failed to honor this distinction on numerous
occasions.32
Despite the Court's inconsistency in application of these two tests, the
potency of the property owner's economic interests in determining the
validity of regulation has increased steadily over the past fifteen years.33
Ultimately, in Lucas, the Court officially held the ecortomic tests to be
determinative of at least a certain subset of takings claims, i.e., those in
which all economic value has been destroyed by regulation.34 The Lucas
Court never clearly discussed the theoretical bases for the economic tests,
however, nor why they should be elevated to such high status within
takings jurisprudence. Had the Court undertaken such a task, it would
have failed. As the following discussion reveals, the foundations of the
29. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) wherein Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, seemed to treat deprivation of economically beneficial use and
denial of reasonable expectations as interchangeable tests; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485 (noting the
property owners had not shown a denial of economically viable use because they had not shown the
challenged regulation made it "impossible" for them "to profitably engage in their business, or that
there has been undue interference with their investment-backed expectations"); United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 129 n.6 (1985) (stating the Court was unable to
evaluate a takings claim because the property owner had failed to introduce evidence of interference
with "economically viable uses of the property or frustrat[ion of] reasorable investment-backed
expectations').
30. See, eg., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96
(1981).
31. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
200 (1985).
32. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (involving an "as
applied" challenge, but applying the Agins test); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (1987) (involving a facial challenge, but applying both the Penn Central and Agins
tests); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986) (involving a facial challenge,
but applying the Penn Central test). See generally Peterson, supra note 12, at 1360-61.
33. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980), where the Court stated
that the property owners "failed to demonstrate that the 'right to exclude others' is so essential to the
use or economic value of their property that the state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a
'taking."' Thus, the Court seemed to suggest that the only interests that matter (at least for
constitutional purposes) are economic ones, despite the fact that the right to exclude has historically
been viewed as a critical element of property rights. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 176 (1979) ("[O]ne of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property [is] the right to exclude others.").
34. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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tests are theoretically infirm and their function within regulatory takings
jurisprudence suspect.
A. The Investment-Backed Expectations Test
1. The Historical Antecedents of the Investment-Backed Expectations
Test
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a regulation that inter-
feres with "reasonable" or "distinct" investment-backed expectations can
give rise to a compensable taking.35 This test originated in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York,36 which involved a challenge to
New York City's Landmark Preservation Law brought by the owners of
Penn Central Terminal. The terminal, "a magnificent example of the
French beaux-arts style,"37 was a designated, regulated landmark. The
owners wanted to lease to a third party the right to construct a multi-story
office building above the terminal.38 After the Landmark Preservation
Commission denied the petition for use, the terminal owners brought suit
alleging a taking without compensation in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.39 In rejecting the owners' claim that the City's
historic landmark regulation effected a taking, the Supreme Court articu-
lated the investment-backed expectations test.
The antecedents of the investment-backed expectations test are, at
best, murky. Prior to Penn Central, the Court's evaluation of regulatory
takings claims focused primarily on factors such as the presence of a
35. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Const. Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2291
(1993); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 853 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 606
(1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,
477 U.S. 340, 349 (1986); Connolly, 475 U.S. at 226; United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 107
(1985); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Kirby Forest Indus. v. United
States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 295 (1981); PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 83; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175; Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Although the Court originally
referred to "distinct" investment-backed expectations, see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), its more -recent formulations have referred to "reasonable"
investment-backed expectations. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe, 113 S. Ct. at 2291; Riverside, 474 U.S. at
129 n.6; PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 83.
36. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
37. Id. at 115.
38. Id. at 116.
39. Id. at 119. The owners also alleged a Fourteenth Amendment due process deprivation. Id.
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physical invasion,40 the diminution in value of the property,4' and a deter-
mination of whether the regulation was intended to prevent a harm or
provide a benefit.42 Justice Brennan stated that the investment-backed
expectations test arose from Justice Holmes' opinion in the landmark
case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,43 yet nowhere in that case does
the phrase "investment-backed expectations" appear.' The phrase was
40. The Supreme Court originally established that a physical invasion could constitute a taking in
Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871), stating that the
invasion must be so severe as to "destroy [the property's] value entirely," and "in effect, subject it to
total destruction." Id. at 177-78. Over the next 90 years, this test evolved into the per se takings test
of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (discussed supra notes
18-20 and accompanying text), where the Court held that even minimal ph)sical invasion will lead
to a taking.
41. The diminution in value theory, articulated in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922), examines the proportion of the value of the property that has been destroyed or taken as a
result of the regulation. Mere diminution in value alone is insufficient to support a finding of a
taking. See id. at 413 ("Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law."); see also
Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2291 (1993)
("[M]ere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insuffcient to demonstrate a
taking.'); Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15 (1984) ("[Impairment of the market
value of real property incident to otherwise legitimate government action ordinarily does not result
in a taking.'); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) ("Mhe
decisions. .. uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can
establish a 'taking' ... '). The Mahon Court noted, however, that if the diminution in value created
by the regulation is too great, the regulation will constitute a taking. 260 U.:3. at 415. The Supreme
Court has, in fact, upheld regulations which have severely diminished the value of property. See,
e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% diminution in value);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87.5% diminution in value). Even Justice Rehnquist,
who appears to be among the most sympathetic of the Justices to private property rights, suggested
in his dissent in Keystone that while "complete extinction of the value of a parcel of property" is
constitutionally prohibited, regulations that preserve at least a part of the value are permissible.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 513-14 (1987) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (noting that in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928), and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), the regalations may have made
the instant properties "of little value," but they "did not completely extinguish the value").
42. The harm/benefit test was articulated in Mugler, 123 U.S. at 667-6), where the Court held
that regulations intended to prevent injurious use of property did not create takings. The Court has
applied the test on numerous instances sinc.. See, e.g., Goldblatt, 369 U.S. 590; Miller, 276 U.S.
272; Hadacheck, 239 U.S. 394. The Supreme Court rejected the harm/benefit distinction in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897-99 (1992). See infra notes 224-28 and
accompanying text. Nonetheless, it plays a role in correct formulation or a workable regulatory
takings theory. See infra text following note 228.
43. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 ("Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), is
the leading case for the proposition that a state statute that substantially furthers important public
policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a 'taking."').
44. In Mahon, a state statute prohibited most mining of coal that would lead to the subsidence of
any house, rendering it "commercially impracticable" for the owners of the coal to mine it. Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (citing 260 U.S. at 414). Mahon did discuss the impact of a diminution in
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apparently coined in a leading article on Takings Clause compensation
authored by Professor Frank I. Michelman a decade prior to the Penn
Central decision,45 an article which was cited by Justice Brennan in his
opinion.46
Michelman's thesis was that compensation for regulatory takings
ought to depend upon considerations such as settlement costs, efficiency
gains, and disproportionate infliction of harm upon particular indi-
viduals.47 His argument was based in part upon Rawlsian notions of fair-
ness,48 and in part upon Bentham's utilitarian property theory. The latter,
according to Michelman, characterizes "property" as "'a basis of expec-
tations' founded on existing rules."'49 "Unpredictable" or "capricious"
redistributions of property will defeat individuals' willingness to engage
in productive labor and in investment, and will ultimately decrease
society's "material well-being."50
value of property on a takings claim, a factor more closely related to the economically viable use test
(discussed infra part I.B).
45. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967).
46. 438 U.S. at 128 (citing Michelman, supra note 45, at 1229-34). Justice Brennan cited
Michelman's article in support of the proposition that complete destruction of economic value may
render a regulation a taking, not as the genesis for the investment-backed expectations test.
47. Michelman, supra note 45, at 1223.
48. Id. at 1219-21. Michelman identified two fundamental principles that flow from Rawls's
notion of"justice as fairness":
The first principle is a general presumption that social arrangements should accord no
preferences to anyone, but should assure to each participant the maximum liberty consistent
with a like liberty on the part of every other participant. The second principle defines a
justification for departures from the first: an arrangement entailing differences in treatment is
just so long as (a) everyone has a chance to attain the positions to which differential treatments
attach, and (b) the arrangement can reasonably be supposed to work out to the advantage of
every participant, and especially the one to whom accrues the least advantageous treatment
provided for by the arrangement in question.
Id. at 1220. Michelman went on to state:
It is not insuperably difficult to see how Rawls's two principles are to be applied by analogy to
test the justice of a compensation practice. Analogous to the equal liberty principle would be a
rule forbidding all efficiency-motivated social undertakings, which have the prima facie effect
of impairing "liberties" unequally, unless corrective measures (compensation payments) are
employed to equalize impacts. The second principle, however, would permit a departure from
this uncompromising rule of full compensation if it could be shown that some other rule should
be expected to work out best for each person insofar as his interests are affected by the social
undertakings giving rise to occasions of compensation.
Id. at 1221.
49. Id. at 1211-12.
50. Id. at 1212.
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Michelman rejected the notion, however, that ut.litarian property
theory would demand the payment of compensation in every instance of
governmental action that disappointed "justified, investment-backed
expectations." ' Rather, compensation is not required for the taking of
investments "which, when they were made, either (a) interrupted some-
one else's enjoyment of an economic good, as should have been appar-
ent; or (b) were of a sort which society had adequately made known
should not become the object of expectations of continuing enjoyment."52
The "investment-backed expectations" factor, which Michelman
explored in the context of the diminution-in-value test,5" provided one
example of such an instance. He noted that, to many courts, the avail-
ability of compensation turned on the degree of loss iaflicted upon the
property owner, 4 and that the purpose of compensation is "to prevent a
special kind of suffering on the part of people who have grounds for
feeling themselves the victims of unprincipled exploitation.""5
The diminution in value test, however, raises a difficult question
regarding segmentation of property interests. Although some degree of
diminution in value must be tolerated without compensation, 6 at some
point the loss inflicted upon the owner becomes impernissibly and dis-
proportionately large in comparison to the property interest left to the
owner, and compensation becomes mandated. Thus, the ultimate ques-
tion becomes what has been taken from the owner relative to what has
been left to the owner." Such a calculation cannot be made without first
defining the underlying property interest against which the loss is to be
gauged. 9 If the loss in value to the regulated property supplies the
numerator of the fraction, what supplies the denominator? Is it the prop-
erty as a whole, or may the property be segmented in some manner
reflecting the nature of the governmental action?"
51. Id. at 1213.
52. Id. at 1241.
53. Id. at 1229-34. See supra note 41 (discussing diminution in value test)
54. Id. at 1190.
55. Id. at 1230.
56. See id. at 1191.
57. Id. at 1232-33.
58. Michelman suggested that the "critical proportion" that would tip the scale from a
noncompensable governmental action to a compensable taking "probably [lias] somewhere between
fifty and one hundred percent." Id. at 1233.
59. Id. at 1192-93.
60. Id.
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This question-what interest supplies the denominator of the
fraction-is a fundamental inquiry in takings analyses based upon eco-
nomic interests of the property owner. It is a thorny issue and one which
has resisted resolution to date.6' Michelman proposed a solution to the
question based not upon the proportionate loss to the owner, but rather
upon the nature of the property interest taken by the government. Tradi-
tionally, he argued, the diminution in value test was applied by first
identifying the denominator of the fraction-the "thing" that had been
taken.62 Only then did the court inquire as to what the owner had lost. If
the regulation took "practically all" of the identified property interest,
compensation was due.63 Michelman argued that the proportion of loss
was not the significant factor; rather, the correct question is "whether or
not the measure in question can easily be seen to have practically
deprived the claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized,
investment-backed expectation. "6
61. In Lucas, Justice Scalia noted that "this uncertainty regarding the composition of the
denominator in our 'deprivation' fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court,"
but declined to resolve the issue because the denominator in the instant case was clearly the fee
simple interest. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992). Justice
Rehnquist has argued that segmentation is permitted. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 517 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[ihere is no need for further
analysis where the government by regulation extinguishes the whole bundle of rights in an
identifiable segment of property, for the effect of this action on the holder of the property is
indistinguishable from the effect of a physical taking.'). The Penn Central Court, on the other hand,
indicated that segmentation was not permitted. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) ('Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated."). The Court also stated in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979): "[D]enial of
one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses
a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking,
because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." In a recent examination of the two economic
tests, the Court reemphasized that segmentation is not permitted. See Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2290 (1993) ("[A] claimant's parcel of
property [cannot] first be divided into what was taken and what was left" to show existence of a
taking.).
62. Michelman, supra note 45, at 1232.
63. Id. at 1232-33.
64. Id. at 1233 (emphasis added). This expectation interest, Michelman argued, could be used to
explain such apparent dichotomies in the law as the rules attaching to nonconforming uses. In
instituting new zoning plans, governmental entities usually grandfather existing uses that will be
nonconforming under the new scheme, while simultaneously rejecting new uses of the same type.
The difference in treatment, according to Michelman, can be attributed to the fact that:
actual establishment of the use demonstrates that the prospect of continuing it is a discrete twig
out of his fee simple bundle to which the owner makes explicit reference in his own thinking, so
that enforcement of the restriction would, as he looks at the matter, totally defeat a distinctly
crystallized expectation.
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Michelman's analysis clearly influenced Justice Brennan as he wrote
the majority opinion in Penn Central The opinion reveals a pervasive,
albeit unfocused, emphasis on the economic effects of the regulation
upon the landowner, or, more specifically, the lack of such effects.
Justice Brennan began by noting that regulatory takings claims must be
resolved by "ad hoc, factual irquiries," which should be guided by
"several factors" of "particular significance," including "[t]he economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant. .. , the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,"
and "the character of the governmental action.""
Justice Brennan seemed to use the term "expectations" as a way of
defining the compensable property interest itself. He stated, for example,
that mere adverse effect upon economic values was insufficient to render
a regulation a taking.66 Rather, the regulation must affect some sort of
recognized "property" interest; no taking occurred where a challenged
regulation "caused economic harm, [but] ... did not interfere with inter-
ests that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of
the claimant to constitute 'property' for Fifth Amendment purposes."67
Id. Thus, the law should see no illogic in grandfathering an existing us,. while simultaneously
barring a new use of the same type.
65. 438 U.S. at 124. Although the investment-backed expectations test was first articulated in
Penn Central, the Court in that case did not have to evaluate whether the regulation at issue affected
such interests. The Penn Central property owners conceded that, even in the face of the regulation,
they were able to make a reasonable return on their investments in the property. Id. at 129. Justice
Brennan's inclusion of "investment-backed expectations" in a list of "factors" to be considered
suggests that interference with investment-backed expectations alone is not sufficient to support a
finding of a taking, although the opinion does not state so specifically.
The Penn Central Court described the "character of the governmental action" factor as follows:
"A 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." Id. at 124 (citation
omitted). Similarly, the Court stated in Lgretto that "when the 'character of the governmental
action' is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to
the extent of the occupation without regard to whether the action achieves an important public
benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner." 458 U.S. at 42 4-35 (citation omitted).
The Court has held other types of actions, such as prohibitions on descent and devise of real
property, to indicate impermissible governmental action as well. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,
704 (1987) (discussed infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text). Actions that serve "genuine,
substantial, and legitimate" state interests, on the other hand, are merely valid exercises of the police
power, the character of these governmental actions would militate against finding a taking. See
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 486. For further discussion of the Court's application of the "character of the
governmental action" factor, see Peterson, svpra note 12, at 1317-19.
66. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
67. Id. at 124-26 (citing United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); Demore;t v. City Bank Co., 321
U.S. 36 (1944); Muhlker v. Harlem R. Co., 197 U.S. 544 (1905); Sax, supra note 15, at 61-62). The
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Thus, Justice Brennan roundly rejected the owners' contention that the
deprivation of their "air rights" above the terminal was a taking, stating
that it was "quite simply untenable" that property owners might establish
a taking by showing that they had "been denied the ability to exploit a
property interest that they heretofore had believed was available for
development."68
The Penn Central Court appeared to adopt the principle that a regula-
tion that rendered property worthless, or nearly worthless, was a taking.69
Regulations that left profitable uses to the owners, on the other hand,
were simply valid exercises of the police power. Justice Brennan stated
that because the owners of the terminal could "continue to use the prop-
erty precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years: as a railroad
terminal,"7 the regulation did not interfere with the owners' "primary
expectation" regarding the use of the land.7 Moreover, the law permit-
ted the owners "not only to profit" from the use of their property, but to
receive a ".reasonable return"' on their investment as well.
72
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority on several
points. First, he argued that it was "irrelevant" that the owners were not
currently using the air rights over the terminal. Like existing uses, uses
that might be "reasonably expected in the immediate future" may also
give rise to a takings claim.73 Thus, owners are entitled to more than a
mere continuation of current profitable uses.
Second, Justice Rehnquist found the majority's reliance on the exis-
tence of a "'reasonable return"' to be laden with uncertainties. If a tak-
ing occurs only when a property owner is denied all reasonable return on
his or her investment,74 the Court is reduced not only to calculating a
Penn Central Court also cited the taxing power as another example of a situation in which a
regulation could damage economic values without resulting in a taking. 438 U.S. at 124.
68. 438 U.S. at 130.
69. Id. at 127-28. In addition to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the Court
cited in support of this proposition Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,355 (1908); Michelman, supra note 45, at 1229-34.
70. 438 U.S. at 136.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 143 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mississippi & Rum
River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403,408 (1879)).
74. Although the majority did not actually state this as a rule, it could be fairly inferred from
Justice Brennan's opinion. In Lucas, the Court indicated that a denial of all economically beneficial
use was a per se taking (at least under some circumstances), see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 (1992); the Lucas Court clearly contemplated that a regulation that
took less than all economically viable use might also effect a taking, although that issue was not
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"reasonable return" for various -types of property (suca as farms, resi-
dences, and commercial and industrial properties)," bul also to defining
the property unit against which the determination is to be made (i.e., may
property be segmented for purposes of this calculation or must the prop-
erty be treated as a whole?).76 Thus, the "reasonable return" analysis
necessarily implicates the segmentation of property issue.7 7
Finally, Justice Rehnquist argued that while case law was settled that a
complete destruction of property rights making it impossible for an
owner to make a reasonable return on his or her property would render
an otherwise valid regulation a taking,7" the converse was not necessarily
true. An otherwise compensable taking does not become a valid exercise
of the police power merely because it leaves the owner some
"reasonable" use of his or her property.79
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central was prescient in identify-
ing the problems inherent in applying the majority's investment-backed
expectations test. As the next subpart discusses, these problems were
brought to the fore in later Supreme Court opinions and. have never been
adequately resolved by the Court. Indeed, these problems are incapable
of judicial resolution because, as discussed below, they reflect the fun-
damental analytical flaws of the investment-backed expectations factor
as a test for regulatory takings.
2. Ambiguities Inherent in the Investment-Backed Expectations Test
The Supreme Court has done little to expound on what actually consti-
tutes an "investment-backed expectation" in the sixteen years since Penn
Central was decided. The Court has indicated that the concept is
grounded in notions of '"justice and fairness,".' 8 that expectations of
"profit" enter into the calculus (in some undefined manner)," and that
before the Court. Id. at 2895 n.8 (noting that although a property owner "whose deprivation is one
step short of complete" does not qualify under Lucas's "categorical formulation," the investment-
backed expectations and economic impact tests may well lead to a finding of a compensable taking).
75. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 149 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing segmentation ofproperty issue).
78. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 149-50 (Relnquist, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Lynah,
188 U.S. 445,470 (1903)).
79. Id.
80. See Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).
81. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
200 (1985) (noting that resolution of the taking question would require "an analysis of the effect [the
regulation] had on the value of respondent's property and investment-backed profit expectations")
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the expectation must be more than a "unilateral expectation or an abstract
need." 2  The Court has replaced its original reference to "distinct"
investment-backed expectations in Penn Central3 with the term
"reasonable" investment-backed expectations in subsequent cases, 84
suggesting that the owner's expectations should be gauged by some
objective standard. The net outcome of all of the Court's efforts is that
the meaning of the phrase remains uncertain, rendering its effectiveness
as a legal doctrine questionable at best.8 5
The difficulties associated with the concept of investment-backed
expectations are legion: what does "expectation" mean? what does
"investment-backed" mean? what types of property interests are affected
by such an analysis? As the next subsection illustrates, these problematic
issues alone ought to be enough to ring the death knell for the invest-
ment-backed expectations test. When the inefficacy of the concept in
evaluating a regulatory taking claim is also considered, it becomes diffi-
cult to understand how the factor ever came into being, much less why its
use has persisted.
a. The Meaning of "Expectations"
Before investment-backed expectations can be analyzed in a specific
case, the term "expectations" must be defined. The Supreme Court has
not attached a clear meaning to this term. In some instances, it has used
the term to refer to things that, conversely, either are or are not protected
property interests; in other instances, it has used the word to indicate that
a property owner, at least under some circumstances, ought to anticipate
further governmental regulation.
(emphasis added). See also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis 480 U.S. 470, 496
(1987) (finding the regulation valid because there was not even "a single mine that [could] no longer
be mined for profit"), id. at 501 ("Petitioners may continue to mine coal profitably.'); Penn Central,
438 U.S. at 136 (explaining that the regulation permitted the property owner "not only to profit from
the Terminal but also to obtain a 'reasonable return' on its investment").
82. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) ("[A] mere
unilateral expectation or an abstract need is not a property interest entitled to protection."). See also
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130 (quoted in text at supra note 68).
83. 438 U.S. at 124.
84. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct.
2264, 2291 (1993); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); PruneYard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
85. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of
Expectations, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1369, 1370 (1993) ("All in all, we should be deeply suspicious of the
phrase 'investment-backed expectations' because it is not possible to identify even the paradigmatic
case of its use.").
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(1) "Expectations" as Property Interests
The word "expectations" is suspect in the takings lexicon; courts often
use "expectation" to refer to an interest less deserving of protection than
a "right."86 For example, the Court has established that expectations do
not necessarily create property rights, particularly where those expecta-
tions arise from governmental action.87 Governmental action may result
in an increase in value to an individual, and thus create an expectation in
the individual that the increased value is a property right protected at
law. The Court is concerned, however, that the creation of property
rights in such a manner might "foreclose[ ] Congre;s' exercise of
[sovereign] authority."8  By denying that the expectaticn is a property
right, the Court ensures that the state's actions are not constrained by the
constitutional protections afforded private property.89
By the same token, however, the Court has also used the word
"expectations" to refer to protected property interests. For example, in
Lucas, Justice Scalia referred to expectations "shaped by the State's law
of property" in discussing the "property" against which diminutions in
value must be gauged.9° Justice Scalia was apparently trying to indicate
that state-law definitions of "property" help to determine which expecta-
tions are protected legal interests and which are mere unilateral hopes or
86. See, e.g., Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnsn, 758 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1985); Deltona Corp. v.
United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (Ct. Cl. 1931), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). As Professor
Epstein has noted: "In some situations, an expectation is considered the aritithesis of a property
right; in others, expectation appears to be the basis of the property right. In still other cases,
expectations seem to embody property rights." Epstein, supra note 85, at 1379.
87. See, e.g., Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986)
(holding that where Congress retained the explicit right to amend or repeal legislation, the legislation
did not create a contractual property right in the state participants); United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S.
488, 488-89, 494 (1973) (holding that expetations created through issuance of federal grazing
permit did not ripen into property interests). Expectations created through acions of private parties
may be more likely to lead to protectable property interests. See, e.g., Almoia Farmers Elevator &
Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474 (1973) (plurality opinion) (finding that
reasonable expectation that lease would be renewed could be considered in determining market value
of property because expectation would have be-en reflected in price a willing buyer would have paid
a willing seller).
88. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. at 52.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945) ("[O]nly
those economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back of them... whether it is a property
right is really the question to be answered.").
90. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992). Cf Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2333 nA (1992)
(noting that "[o]utside the context of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has not hesitated to
recognize the legitimacy of protecting reliance and expectational interests," and citing Penn Central
in support).
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desires on the part of property owners that do not ripen into legally cog-
nizable interests.
When used in this sense, however, the term "expectations" becomes
circular-a problem noted by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in
Lucas: "[I]f the owner's reasonable expectations are shaped by what
courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property
tends to become what courts say it is."91 This is a trap in which the Court
has been caught in the past. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,92
for example, the Court noted "the importance of honoring reasonable
expectations in property interests"'93 but emphasized that "such expecta-
tions can only be of consequence where they are 'reasonable' ones, 94
and that expectations "contrary" to state definitions of property are inher-
ently unreasonable.95 Thus, the expectation is legitimate if state law
regards it as such, but is not legitimate if state law regards it other-
wise-a profoundly unhelpful statement when the goal is to define
permissible limits of governmental regulation. It reduces the constitu-
tional analysis to a situation in which the fox is the sole guard of the
henhouse.
(2) "Expectations" of Future Governmental Regulation
Michelman suggested that property owners are not entitled to com-
pensation for value-depleting changes in regulation that were easily
anticipated. He posed a hypothetical in which an individual purchased
scenic land along a highway in the midst of public debate over the for-
bidding of all development upon such land. In Michelman's view, the
market ought to reflect (through a reduced purchase price) the risk of
legislation banning development of the property. If such legislation is
ultimately passed, the new owner's claim to compensation in the amount
91. 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy went on to state that circularity
is inevitable in constitutional matters and that circularity in this particular instance was diminished
by the fact that "[t]he expectations protected by the Constitution are based on objective rules and
customs that can be understood as reasonable by all parties involved." Id.
To the extent that those "objective rules and customs" arise from judicial decisions, however, the
circularity problem is not avoided. See Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1395, 1505 (1991) ("Over time .... the more the Court's own pronouncements tend to
shape public expectations, the more the Court's reliance on these expectations threatens to
deteriorate into a blatant case of self-fulfilling prophecy.").
92. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).




of the difference between the value of the land with and without the
regulation is "weak. 96 Because the new owner purchased property at a
discounted price reflecting the possibility of the restrictions, the owner
got "exactly" that for which she bargained. 7 The redistribution in this
instance, in Michelman's view, is no different than the redistribution that
occurs when society refuses to refund the price of a losing lottery ticket. 8
Michelman's argument is fraught with difficulty, as he himself recog-
nized when he noted that it required "gingerly handling."99 Michelman
was concerned that his argument opened up the possibility of govern-
mental abuse, as government officials could engage in strategic declara-
tions of intent to regulate in the future, thus reducing property values
and, concomitantly, eventual costs of takings."4
Michelman's argument falters on other grounds as well. In the
instance of the lottery ticket, the purchaser buys from the state the right
to one chance to win a pool of money. If the purchaser were to sell the
ticket to a third party, the price would remain constant because the bar-
gained-for value is fixed-the right to one chance to win the money. In
Michelman's highway scenario, however, the original owner had a piece
of property that, prior to the passing of legislation, presumably could
have been developed in some productive manner. If legislation is passed
that constitutes a taking of this property, the owner has a constitutional
right to expect a full and equivalent compensation from i:he state for the
loss of value suffered. If the property were to change hands during the
public debate period, the right to obtain that compensation would pass
along with the title to the land."' Although the market might discount
the value of the property slightly to account for the hassles attendant
96. Michelman, supra note 45, at 1238.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1238 n.124.
100. Id. He posited, for example, a situation in which a government official, intending the future
construction of a highway and wishing to hold down the costs of future condemnation, could
discourage construction along the proposed route merely by periodically reminding potential
builders of the government's plans.
101. Justice Scalia recognized this point in Nollan, where, in writing for the majority, he stated
that "the prior owners must be understood to have transferred their full property rights in conveying"
their land; thus, a land-use restriction invalid as against the existing owner is invalid as against later
owners as well. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.2 (1987). See also
Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Proper
, 
and the Power of Eminent Domain 155 (1985) ("In
this case of threatened restrictions, the original owner of the land does not hold his title at the
pleasure of the state. Instead, he has rights that are good against the state; there is no reason why he
cannot convey to his purchaser whatever rights he has against the state.").
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upon a taking of the property, the constitutional guarantee of just com-
pensation will ensure that it will not discount the full development value
of the parcel. 2
The flaw in Michelman's position is easily illustrated if we simply
assume that the property does not change hands during the debate period.
If the legislation were passed and all development forbidden, the original
owner surely would be entitled to compensation for the loss of the prop-
erty interest (which is undoubtedly a "sharply crystallized investment-
backed expectation'). 0 3 The change in ownership during the debate
period should not result in a different outcome regarding the availability
of compensation because change in ownership does not defeat the exis-
tence of any type of property interest. Under Michelman's analysis,
however, the transferring owner would experience an uncompensated
taking because the new owner would discount the property's price to
reflect the risk of an uncompensated loss of development rights. The
practical effect of Michelman's rule would be a reduction in the market-
ability of property during periods of proposed regulatory change as
owners sought to protect themselves against diminution of their property
values by avoiding market transactions.
Despite its analytical and theoretical weaknesses, Michelman's argu-
ment has worked its way into takings jurisprudence.t 104 The Supreme
Court has, on numerous occasions, discussed the property owner's
"expectations" in the context of the owner's reasonable expectation of
future governmental regulation of the property involved. For example,
in Lucas, Justice Scalia stated that property owners "necessarily" expect
their property to periodically be subject to additional restrictions by the
state, provided such restrictions are enacted as valid exercises of the
police power.'05
This notion-that the property owner's expectations are somehow
bound up in the owner's ability to anticipate governmental regula-
102. See Epstein, supra note 101, at 155 (noting that Michelman "has the relationship between
prices and rights backward. We do not use prices to determine rights; we use rights to determine
prices.").
103. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
104. Although the Supreme Court has never directly referred to this section of Michelman's
analysis, other courts have. See, e.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 237, 246 (Cal. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976). The influence of the argument is easily recognized in the
Supreme Court's opinions, as discussed infra notes 106-20 and accompanying text.
105. 112 S. Ct. at 2899 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
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tion-was articulated in earlier Court opinions as well."° In Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co.,10 7 for example, the Court evaluated the petitioner's
claim that it would suffer a compensable taking if the government were
permitted to publicly disclose data (including trade secrets) that the peti-
tioner had been required to submit in order to obtain registration of a
pesticide under a federal statute."' The Court analyzed the issue in terms
of the Penn Central three-part test, finding that the investment-backed
expectations test was the controlling one under the facts before it.0 9
The Monsanto Court concluded that the challenged regulation did not
interfere with investment-backed expectations because the petitioner had
submitted its data to the government after the statute had been amended
to clarify that disclosure might occur.' The petitioner was thus "on
notice" regarding the government's ability to disclose the data. It had the
option of either applying for registration for the pesticide and risking
disclosure of its trade secrets, or forgoing the application procedure in
order to protect its property interest."' The petitioner also had no legiti-
mate claim of investment-backed expectations with ::espect to data
submitted prior to the amendment of the statute because the government
had never promised to keep such information private." 2 More important,
the Court found that the heavily regulated nature of the pesticide industry
should have put the petitioner on notice that future disclosure might
occur. 
113
106. Each of which, incidentally, involved non-real property interests. See infra notes 107-19
and accompanying text (discussing Monsanto, Connolly, and Gilliard).
107. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
108. The statute was the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§
136-136y (1988). The property interest at stake was the petitioner's interest in its data, to the extent
that that data were cognizable as trade-secret property rights under state law. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at
1003.
109. 467 U.S. at 1005.
110. Id. at 1006.
111. The Court rejected the petitioner's claim that the options presented to it were
unconstitutional because they forced the petitioner to choose between obiaining registration or
protecting its property interest. The Court noted that the government was free to regulate marketing
and sale of pesticides and that the petitioner had the option of selling in foreign markets if it was
unwilling to risk disclosure of its data. Id. at 1007 & n.11.
112. Id. at 1008 ("[A]bsent an express prcmise, [the petitioner] had no reasonable, investment-
backed expectation that its information would remain inviolate in the hands of [the government].").
113. Id. at 1008-09. The Court further noted that between 1972 and 1978, :he statutory scheme in
effect permitted petitioners to designate data as trade secrets at the time of submitting the data, thus
protecting the data from disclosure. The government's promise of confidentiality under those
circumstances created "reasonable, investment-backed expectations" that that data would remain
secret. If the government were to attempt to disclose that information, the Court concluded, a
compensable taking would arise. Id. at 1011. See also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 607 (1987)
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One year later, the Court faced the same issue again, in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission. 14 This time, however, the Court found
in favor of the property owner, not the government." 5 The California
Coastal Commission had conditioned a building permit upon the prop-
erty owners granting the public an easement to cross their beach. Both
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, writing separate dissents, found it sig-
nificant that the property owners had been aware of the Commission's
policy before they purchased the property." 6 That knowledge, in their
view, put the owners on notice of the restriction and prevented the
owners from asserting a takings claim. The majority disagreed that
Nollan was analogous to Monsanto or Bowen v. Gilliard,"7 finding that
those two cases involved the yielding of a property right in exchange for
a "valuable Government benefit.""'  Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, stated that the right to build on one's own private property may
(explaining that recipients of child support payments must anticipate that changes in law might
reduce those payments); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986) (finding
that those who do business in a regulated field must anticipate amendments to regulation; thus,
change in withdrawal liability provisions of federal statute did not work a taking as to trustees of
pension funds affected by such change).
114. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
115. The actual holding in Nollan was based on police power grounds. See infra note 239 and
accompanying text.
116. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 859 (Brennan, 3., dissenting) and 866 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117. 483 U.S. 587 (1987). Gilliard involved a regulation that reduced welfare benefits to families
as a result of child support payments received by a single member of the family. The Supreme Court
refused to find an interference with "vested protectable expectation[s]," noting that the government
must remain free to modify legislation. Id. at 607. Gilliard presents a weaker case than Monsanto or
Connolly, for in Gilliard, the petitioner's property interest arose from a welfare program voluntarily
created by the government (and thus more clearly subject to governmental modification). In
Monsanto and Connolly, on the other hand, the petitioners had property interests cognizable under
state law that did not arise from governmental largesse.
118. 483 U.S. at 833-34 n.2 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984);
Gilliard, 483 U.S. at 605). It is unclear what "property right" was at stake in Gilliard. Although the
allegation was that a mandatory assignment of child support payments to the state in exchange for
welfare benefits for the family unit was a taking of the child's private property, 483 U.S. at 595-96,
the Court noted that under state law, "support is 'not a property right of the child."' Id. at 607 (citing
Layton v. Layton, 139 S.E.2d 732, 734 (N.C. 1965)). If the child has no property interest in future
support payments, governmental modification of the right to receive such payments cannot work a
taking.
The welfare payments at issue in Gilliard clearly did involve the granting of a government benefit
to which conditions may be attached. Monsanto, on the other hand, involved the marketing of a
product. While the government is entitled to regulate such marketing through police power actions
intended to prevent harm to public safety and welfare, see supra note 15 and accompanying text, the
right to market the product itself is hardly a "government benefit." The correct analysis in Monsanto
should have centered on the legitimacy of the regulation under the police power. Thus, Gilliard and
Monsanto are not analogous cases.
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be conditioned upon "legitimate permitting requirements," but "cannot
remotely be described as a 'governmental benefit."' 9
Thus, the Court has taken the position that property owners, at least
under certain circumstances, ought to anticipate changes in the law and
that anticipated changes will not constitute an interference with reason-
able investment-backed expectations such that a compensable taking will
arise. z This position leads to perverse outcomes. Il' we accept the
premise that enactment of one piece of legislation puts a property owner
"on notice" that more restrictive regulations might be enacted in the
future as well, we find ourselves faced with a reductio ad absurdum-the
existence of the first regulation will defeat any claims the owner might
have regarding the sanctity of the property interest in the future. By
merely enacting one regulation (even a relatively non-in.trusive one that
is clearly a legitimate exercise of the police power), the government
opens a path for eventual, incremental taking of the entire property inter-
est without payment of compensation.'
This position is untenable. The expectations of the property owner
that a change in legislation might or might not occur, whether reasonable
or not, and whether "investment-backed" or not, are utterly irrelevant to
takings law. Provided it stays within the constraints of the police power,
the government clearly has the power and the right to amend a regulation
if it so wishes, regardless of whether that amendment is foreseeable to or
expected by the affected property owner."2 On the other hand, even a
119. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.2. Justice Brennan rejected this distinction, stating: "If the Court
is somehow suggesting that 'the right to build on one's own property' has some privileged natural
rights status, the argument is a curious one. By any traditional labor theory of value justification for
property rights, Monsanto would have a superior claim . . . . Id. at 860 n.10 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
120. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct.
2264, 2292 (1993) (holding that those doing business in a regulated field have no "reasonable
expectation" that they will not face additional financial liability as a result of changes in legislation);
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986) (aoting that "prudent"
petitioners were on notice from earlier amendments to the challenged statutes that future
amendments might not only be enacted, but also impose additional financial obligations upon them).
Cf. Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 457 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (explaining that the principle
underlying the investment-backed expectations factor is that where the "burdens consequent upon
government action" are "substantial and unforeseeable," they must, in 'jttice and fairness," be
"borne by the public as a whole").
121. As Epstein so succinctly put it, "Each round of government reg,,ulation thus provides
justification for the next." Epstein, supra note 85, at 1371.
122. In the face of a legitimate exercise of the police power, property owners have no right to rely
upon an expectation that the government will not alter an existing regulation unless the government
promised that it would not and the owner relied upon that promise. In those instances, however, the
owner's claim would seem to arise under estoppel or vested rights doctrine, not under the Takings
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completely foreseeable regulatory change, if it exceeds the bounds of the
police power, is impermissible. The foreseeability of regulatory amend-
ment does not render that amendment constitutional; conversely, the dif-
ficulty of predicting the amendment does not render the regulation a
taking.' 2
b. The Meaning of "Investment-Backed"
The mere fact that a property owner has an expectation backed by a
monetary investment cannot be the basis for constitutional protection; if
it were, this test would shift the power to determine the validity of regu-
lations to property owners.'24 Suppose, for example, that a developer
purchases a large parcel of land zoned for agricultural use for $100,000.
As agricultural land, the property is worth $25,000; as commercial land,
the property would be worth $200,000. The developer hopes to have the
land rezoned for a higher density use and has paid a $75,000 premium
for the land because of that expectation or desire. If the municipality
refuses to rezone the land, the developer's investment-backed expecta-
tions have, without doubt, been interfered with, yet it is ludicrous to
argue that the developer has suffered a compensable taking as a result of
the municipality's refusal to change the existing zoning on the property.
A unilateral hope by the purchaser that the land will be rezoned to a
higher use cannot, by itself, give rise to a compensable taking, for that
Clause. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31 Wash.
U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 3, 5, 37-41 (1987). In Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the Court declined to state whether the "economic viability"
test would apply to a takings claim based upon "vested rights" or "expectation interest." Id. at
191-92 n.12. Cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979) (stating that action of a
government official cannot "estop" the government, but "it can lead to the fruition of a number of
expectancies embodied in the concept of'property'--expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the
Government must condemn and pay for").
123. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 511,
524-25 (1986) (noting that arguments that actors should always anticipate legal change "begs the
normative question . .. because the fact that legal change is expected does not imply that
compensation is never appropriate in response").
124. This point is ably discussed in John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 Minn. L.
Rev. 339, 360-65 (1989), in the context of economically viable uses. The same analysis applies to
investment-backed expectations.
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Kaiser Aetna, raised the concern that the extent of the owner's
investment should not be permitted to influence the Court's analysis of a takings claim. He rejected
the majority opinion, at least in part, because it "embrace[d] ... an implication that the amount of the
private investment somehow influences the legal result." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 183 n.2 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As he correctly noted, the outcome should be the
same "whether the developer invested $100 or... 'millions of dollars."' Id. at 184 n.2.
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would mean that any individual willing to overpay for property could
force a change in regulation. It may be that the undefined requirement
that investment-backed expectations be "reasonable'" is intended to
address these types of concerns."z Indeed, the Court has noted in the
past that "unilateral" expectations or "abstract" needs do not rise to the
level of constitutionally protected interests.'26
Nevertheless, Justice Brennan's discussion in Penn Central of
"reasonable return" on investment could be read as stating that the gov-
ernment has an obligation (through modification of regulations) to assure
owners a reasonable rate of return on their investments, even in light of
changing circumstances.' 27 The Penn Central Court emphasized that its
holding was based upon the fact that the owners were able to use the
Terminal for "its intended purposes and in a gainful :.ashion."' 25 The
opinion further suggested that a future change in circumstances that ren-
dered the Terminal's use economically non-viable might entitle the own-
ers to relief.'29
The term "investment-backed '" raises a second question: by using that
term, does the Supreme Court mean to indicate that expectations that
would be protected if they were investment-backed will not be protected
if the owner received them through gift, inheritance, or devise? The
Supreme Court seemed to suggest this result in Hodel v. Irving.3 ' In
response to extreme fractionalization of Indian lands, Congress enacted
the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, which provided for escheat
of certain lands to the tribe, and which prohibited descent of those lands
by intestacy or devise. The statute contained no provision for compen-
sating disappointed heirs or devisees. The Court analyzed the statute
under the familiar, three-prong inquiry regarding "the economic impact
of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed
expectations, and the character of the governmental action.'' Although
the Court ultimately struck down the provision because of the
125. The Court has never indicated what makes an expectation "reasonable" or "unreasonable."
126. See supra note 82 and accompanying taxt.
127. Or perhaps even in light of overpayment by subsequent owners. See supra note 124 and
accompanying text.
128. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978).
129. Id. (noting that "[the city conceded &t oral argument that if appellants can demonstrate at
some point in the future that circumstances have so changed that the Terminal ceases to be
'economically viable,' appellants may obtain relief) (citation omitted).
130. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
131. Id. at 714 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
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"extraordinary" nature of the regulation,"' the majority opinion, penned
by Justice O'Connor, contained disturbing dicta. The Court noted that
virtually all of the owners had acquired their interests "by gift, descent,
or devise"; thus, the Court concluded that it was "dubious" whether any
of the owners had "investment-backed expectations in passing on [their]
property." 133
Taken literally, the Court's dicta leads to a ludicrous outcome. Surely
the donee of property has the same rights regarding the use of his or her
property that the purchaser of that property would have. 34  It seems
highly improbable that the Irving Court would have actually held that a
claimant who had purchased her fractionalized share of Indian lands was
permitted to devise it, while simultaneously denying that right to a
claimant who had received his share through inheritance or gift.131
Constitutional protection of property does not, and should not, depend
upon either the unilateral actions of the property owner or the manner in
which the property was acquired. The phrase "investment-backed,"
however, opens up the possibility that such impermissible considerations
will be taken into account in evaluating a takings claim, and increases the
likelihood that incorrect determinations will be made.
B. The Economically Viable Use Test
1. The Historical Antecedents of the Economically Viable Use Test
The second economic test developed by the Supreme Court is the eco-'
nomically viable use test. Although the Penn Central Court did mention
"economically viable" uses, the reference was tangential and confined to
a footnote.'36 This test was not explicitly articulated until the Supreme
132. Id. at 716-17 (recognizing the importance of the right to leave property to others through
descent and devise within the American legal system and finding that a "total abrogation" of such
rights is not permitted). Thus, the regulation was actually held invalid under the "character of the
government action" prong of the Penn Central test.
133. Id. at 715. The Court indicated that none of the appellees could "point to any specific
investment-backed expectations beyond the fact that their ancestors agreed to accept allotment only
after ceding to the United States large parts of the original Great Sioux Reservation.' Id.
134. See Epstein, supra note 85, at 1370.
135. The Court's language seems to suggest such an outcome: "Though it is conceivable that
some of these interests were purchased with the expectation that the owners might pass on the
remainder to their heirs at death, the property has been held in trust for the Indians for 100 years and
is overwhelmingly acquired by gift, descent, or devise." 481 U.S. at 715.
136. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978) ("The city
conceded at oral argument that if [the owners] can demonstrate at some point in the future that
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Court decided Agins v. City of Tiburon"3 7 two years afler Penn Central.
In Agins, the Court held that a regulation constitutes a taking if the regu-
lation fails to substantially advance a legitimate state interest or if it
denies a property owner economically viable use of his or her property.'38
Since then, the Supreme Court has so often repeated the notion that a
land-use regulation effects a taking if it denies the owner "economically
viable use" of his or her property that its recitation has -taken on the aura
of an incantation." 9
Although the Court introduced the economically viable use factor in
A gins, the facts of the case made it a poor vehicle fbr exploring the
boundaries of such a concept. Agins involved a challenge to a city plan
that had reduced the permitted density on five acres of undeveloped land.
In a short opinion, the Court unanimously held that the challenged regu-
lation substantially advanced the legitimate state goal of protecting the
city residents "from the ill effects of urbanization."' 40  Tae Court went on
to state that while the regulation undoubtedly did limit development of
the land, it neither prevented the "best use" of the land nor
"extinguish[ed] a fundamental attribute of ownership.""" The Court did
circumstances have so changed that the Terminal ceases to be 'economically viable,' [the owners]
may obtain relief."). The Court also noted that a regulation may "perhaps" constitute a taking "if it
has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property." Id. at 127. In fact, the property
owners in Penn Central conceded that, even in the face of the regulation, they were able to make a
reasonable return on their investment. Id. at 129. Thus, an economically viable use of the property
undeniably existed; it simply was not the more profitable use desired by the o'ners.
137. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
138. See id. at 260. In applying the first part of the test, the Court generally either applies the
minimum rationality standard of substantive due process or looks to see whether the government is
preventing nuisance-like conduct. See Peterson, supra note 12, at 1327-30. As discussed infra note
220 and accompanying text, I would argue that a regulation that fails to substantially advance a
legitimate state interest is not a taking at all, but is rather an invalid regulation.
139. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates
v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 349 (1986): United States v. Riverside Baview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121, 126 (1985); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 191 (1985); Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 296 (1981); Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981).
140. 447 U.S. at 261. According to the Court:
The City Council ... found that "[i]t is in the public interest to avoid unnecessary conversion of
open space land to strictly urban uses, thereby protecting against the resultant adverse impacts,
such as air, noise and water pollution, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic beauty,
disturbance of the ecology and environment hazards to geology, fire and flood, and other
demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl."
Id. at 261 n.8 (citation omitted).
141. Id. at 262 (citations omitted).
Cornering the Quark: Takings Analysis
not discuss the regulation's impact on development in terms of the eco-
nomically viable use concept it had just introduced but rather noted that
state law regulations on development ensured that the owners were "free
to pursue their reasonable investment expectations by submitting a devel-
opment plan to local officials."'42
Although the Court applied the economically viable use test in several
subsequent cases, 43 it was not until its 1992 decision in Lucas that the
Court discussed the possible justifications underlying the test. Justice
Scalia, writing for the Lucas majority, noted that as a general matter, the
right to "use" property has long been viewed as a fundamental character-
istic of property,'" and the Supreme Court has been reluctant to allow
excessive governmental interference with this right. The right to "use" is
not absolute; thus, the Agins line of cases establishes that a taking of a
substantial part of a property will not result in a compensable taking
where the property as a whole retains an "economically viable use."'4 5
However, as Justice Scalia noted, from the landowner's viewpoint, total
deprivation of economic use is no different from a physical appropria-
tion. 146  Where such a deprivation has occurred, the legislature is not
simply "adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life"'47 so as to
achieve an "average reciprocity of advantage" to all concerned.'48
Rather, where a regulation deprives an owner of all economically bene-
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 853 (1987); Kirby Forest
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,296 (1981); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450
U.S. 621,621 (1981). See generally cases cited supra note 9.
144. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893-95 (1992); See also Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336
(1984) (quoting Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 682, 686 (M.D. Ga. 1963)):
We have little difficulty accepting the theory that the use of valuable property ... is itself a
legally protectible property interest. Of the aggregate rights associated with any property
interest, the right of use of property is perhaps of the highest order.
One court put it succinctly: ."Property' is more than just the physical thing-the land, the
bricks, the mortar-it is also the sum of all of the rights and powers incident to ownership of the
physical thing. It is the tangible and the intangible. Property is composed of constituent elements
and of these elements the right to use the physical thing to the exclusion of others is the most
essential and beneficial. Without this right all other elements would be of little value."
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); See also United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
145. See cases cited supra note 9 and accompanying text.
146. 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
147. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
148. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922)).
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ficial or productive uses of his or her property, it becomes more likely
that the regulation masks an invalid effort to press private property into
public service.'49
The economically viable use test has come to dominate regulatory
takings cases. Like the investment-backed expectations test, however,
the economically viable use test is salted with analytical ambiguities and
flaws that make reasoned application of the test difficult, if not
impossible.
2. Ambiguities Inherent in the Notion of "Economically Viable Use"
a. The Economics of an Economically Viable Use
The Supreme Court has never acknowledged the assumptions implicit
in the phrase "economically viable use." An "economically viable use"
can only be judged in reference to some base price, i.e., as a return on
investment. The Supreme Court has suggested in dicta on numerous
occasions that the notion of "profit" is relevant to deternining the exis-
tence of a regulatory taking,50 although it has also stated that the
"interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less com-
pelling than other property-related interests."'' Certainly, the owner has
no constitutional entitlement to make the "most beneficial use" of his or
her property. 5 2  The question is whether the owner is constitutionally
guaranteed the right to make a profit, and if so, how that profit should be
calculated.
149. Id. at 2894-95 (citations omitted).
150. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495-96 (1987)
(indicating that regulation will effect a taking if the uses remaining to the owner are "commercially
impracticable ... to continue"); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, ]nc., 474 U.S. 121, 127
n.4 (1985) (stating that if uses left to owner are not "productive," the regulation may effect a taking);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982) (stting that "[a]lthough
deprivation of the tight to use and obtain a profit from property is not, in every case, independently
sufficient to establish a taking ... it is clearly relevant" ) (citation omitted); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978) (stating that if the uses left for the owner are not
"gainful," the regulation may effect a taking); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414
(1922) (indicating that regulation making property "commercially impracticable" to use "has very
nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroyi'g if').
151. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). See also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436 (stating that
"deprivation of the right to use and obtain a profit from property is not, in every case, independently
sufficient to establish a taking").
152. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (noting that if regulation is
otherwise a valid police power act, "the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use
does not render it unconstitutional'); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168
(1958) (same),
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Suppose that a regulation permits a use of property that generates
$10,000 of net income each year. Whether that use is economically
viable will depend in part upon the relevant interest rate and in part upon
the value assigned to the underlying property. If the property is valued at
$100,000, an annual net income of $10,000 probably is an economically
viable use (assuming an interest rate that conforms to historical patterns).
If the property is valued at $10 million, however, rational investors
would regard the use as economically nonviable.
Before a calculation of whether the use is "economically viable" can
be made, therefore, it is necessary to identify the underlying property
value on which the return is calculated. That underlying property value
can be defined in several different ways. One possibility is the purchase
price as the profitability of property necessarily is a function of the
amount the owner paid for the property. Using purchase price to evalu-
ate the economically viable use of property poses the same problem as
using purchase price to evaluate investment-backed expectations: 13 can a
property owner who has overpaid for property based upon an unrealistic
unilateral expectation regarding future uses claim she has suffered a tak-
ing because she has been denied economically viable use of the prop-
erty? The answer here, as in the investment-backed expectations context,
must be "no." Takings jurisprudence cannot turn on the unilateral or
subjective expectations of property owners.
In Lucas, for example, the property owner paid $975,000 for the two
lots at issue. A short time later, the lots were rezoned so as to substan-
tially restrict the uses to which they could be put.54 As Justice Black-
mun stated in his dissent, the property was not completely without use:
the owner could "picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the property in
a movable trailer."' 5 The owner could also sell the land to others or
exclude other parties from it-both important attributes of property own-
ership.'56 The problem, in the majority's view, was that those uses were
insufficient given the underlying value of the land. As Justice Blackmun
noted, however, the lots had changed hands several times in the seven
years before Lucas had purchased them. One of the lots originally sold
153. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
154. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112S. Ct. 2886,2889 (1992).
155. Id. at 2908.
156. Id. Whether alienability of land so restricted in use is a valuable or meaningful property
interest is a separate question, however, and one which Justice Blackmun did not address.
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for $96,660 in 1979.157 Had the person who purchased the property in
1979 still owned the property, would the uses left to the property have
been deemed economically viable ones in that individual's hands? If the
determination of economically viable use changes with purchase price,
the constitutionality of regulation is, at least to some extent, determined
by timing of ownership and market forces-an incongruous notion, as it
means that regulations would be more likely to be unconstitutional as
applied to a new owner who purchased the property in times of rising
property values than in times of stagnating values, regardless of the fact
that the regulation was in place when she bought the property.
Or suppose that Lucas had decided to cut his losses and had sold the
property after the regulation for $50,000. Would the new owner be heard
to complain?158  The uses left to the property might well be
"economically viable" given the reduced price of the property. That
would mean, however, that the validity of regulation woui.d be tied to the
identity of the property owner and to the purchase price he or she
paid-a very strange proposition indeed, and one that would both create
massive uncertainty for government regulators and emrbroil courts in
messy determinations of fact.
The correct analysis, of course, is that the timing of the property
owner's acquisition of the property at stake is irrelevant to the determi-
nation of whether the regulation effects a taking. Nonetheless, the Court
has indicated that "timing of acquisition" is "relevant to a takings analy-
sis." 9 Timing of acquisition may well affect whether the owner has any
expectations with regard to the use of the property, but it has nothing to
do with the constitutionality of the underlying regulation. An invalid
regulation does not become valid just because the propelty is now in the
hands of a new, post-regulation owner.
157. Id. at 2905 n.3 ("The properties were sold frequently at rapidly escalating prices before
Lucas purchased them. Lot 22 was first sold in 1979 for $96,660, sold in 1984 for $187,500, then in
1985 for $260,000, and, finally, to Lucas in 1986 for $475,000.").
158. Under Michelman's analysis, the answer would be "no" because the new owner purchased
the property knowing of the restrictions. See .:upra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
159. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 n.21 (1979). In Andrus, the govermment had argued that
the property owners had not clearly indicated they had purchased their avian artifacts before the
regulation prohibiting the sale of such items had gone into effect, and that if the owners had
purchased them after the regulation, the owners could not complain about any diminution in value
caused by the challenged regulation. The Court seemed to accept this argument, noting that "[t]he
timing of acquisition of the artifacts is relevant to a takings analysis of [the owners'] investment-
backed expectations." Id. See generally infra notes 178-85 and accompanying text (discussing
Andrus).
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Rejection of purchase price as the basis for determining economically
viable uses leads us to a second possibility: economically viable uses
could be calculated relative to the fair market value of the property. This
formulation would eliminate the possibility of unilateral manipulation by
the property owner but would pose a separate issue of its own: should the
market value be calculated before or after the effects of the disputed
regulation are taken into account? Market value (at least of commercial
and industrial property) is ordinarily a function of the rate of return on
investment, which, at least in part, is a function of applicable land use
regulations. Thus, using fair market value to determine economically
viable use renders the entire analysis circular. 60
For example, suppose that the highest and best use of property under
current zoning practices generates $10,000 of annual income. If property
of that type trades for 10 times earnings, the property's fair market value
is $100,000. Assume that after the current owner paid that price for the
property, a zoning ordinance is enacted that reduces annual earnings to
$6,000. If the economically viable use of the property is calculated
based upon the fair market value of the property before the regulation is
placed into effect, any non-trivial diminution in return on investment
could cause the zoning change to be labeled a taking. Indeed, under this
approach, few regulations would survive a takings challenge. Regula-
tions that reduce a property's rate of return in furtherance of a legitimate
governmental objective would be as likely to be struck down as those
that are really nothing more than disguised takings.
If the economically viable use is calculated based upon fair market
value after the regulation is placed into effect, the existence of imper-
missible takings will be shielded by market forces. In the above exam-
ple, the question would become whether $6,000 was an economically
viable return on property now valued at $60,000 (10 times earnings).
Obviously, this rate of return is identical to that received by the property
owner when the property generated $10,000 a year on an underlying
investment of $100,000. Virtually all regulations, provided they leave
some return to property, would survive this formulation of the rule.
Also inherent in the economically viable use test is an assumption that
maintenance of the status quo is the most to which a property owner is
entitled. The Penn Central Court, for example, seemed to assume that
160. The Court recognized this in an analogous setting of rate-making. See Duquesne Light Co.
v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 n.5 (1989) ("capital assets [cannot] be valued by the stream of income
they produced because setting that stream of income was the very object of the rate proceeding").
See generally Humbach, supra note 124, at 364.
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continuation of current use (provided it is profitable) is the most to which
an owner is entitled. 6 ' This is not necessarily true. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that a property owner, A, builds a home on land zoned for single-
family use, which she then leases for a profitable rent. Over time, the
vacant land around her is rezor-ed and developed for industrial uses.
Assume further that A can continue to get a reasonable return on her
rental house, 62 but that her property would be far more valuable if
rezoned and redeveloped for industrial uses. If the city were to refuse to
rezone A's land, despite the changed character of the area, it could
scarcely claim that its refusal was conclusively a legitimate exercise of
the police power simply because A was left with a reasonable return on
investment. The disparity in zoning between A's property and the sur-
rounding property deprives A of any reciprocal benefit :From the govern-
mental regulation; 63 thus, the regulation is invalid."6
In sum, there is no certain base against which to measure the existence
of "economically viable" uses. Without a clear foundation upon which
to build, the economically viable use analysis necessarily fails.
b. The Relevancy of the Economically Viable Use Test to Takings
Claims
The economically viable use factor, standing alone, provides little or
no information regarding the validity of the takings clahn. The true issue
is the legitimacy of the governmental interest at stake. Suppose that B
owns property zoned for single-family residential use; it is B's intent to
build a single-family home on tae property for his own personal use in
the near future. Zoned for this use, the property is worth $20,000.
Before B begins construction, however, the city determines that a need
for multi-family, low-income housing exists in the at-ea, and that B's
property is the ideal location for such a use. It rezones B's property for
that use, prohibiting all less intense uses (including single-family resi-
dential use). All other property in the area is zoned for single-family use.
161. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
162. Of course, this raises the problematic issue of how a reasonable return ought to be calculated.
163. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133-35 (1978)
(discussing relative benefits and burdens of regulation); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393,415 (1922); see generally infra note 229 and accompanying text.
164. This is the point that Justice Rehnquist made in his dissent in Penn Central 438 U.S. at 143
(Rehnquist. J., dissenting) (discussed supra note 79 and accompanying text). Though invalid, the
regulation is not a taking-a critical distinction that is discussed further at note 220 infra and
accompanying text.
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With the rezoning in place, the property is now worth $50,000. The city
has no intention of building the multi-family, low-income housing itself;
rather, it is hopeful that because it has zoned the property for such a use,
B will sell the property to a developer who will undertake such a project.
B is now barred from developing his property in the way that he pre-
fers. He is also prohibited from using his property in the same way that
all of his neighbors are permitted to use theirs. He has suffered no loss in
economically viable use, however; in fact, the value of his property has
increased substantially. In such an instance, the court cannot rely solely
upon the economically viable use factor in determining the validity of the
regulation; rather, it must examine the regulation to determine whether it
advances a legitimate state interest. If so, B will not be heard to com-
plain. If not, the regulation is invalid, despite the fact that B's property
has not diminished in market value (and has, in fact, increased in
value).'65
Similarly, a regulation may deny an owner all economically viable use
without effecting a taking. The classic example is that of ard land suit-
able only for uranium mining."' The government is clearly entitled to
ban uranium mining by the public, but if it does so, it will deprive the
land owner of any economically viable use of the property. Nonetheless,
the regulation does not result in a taking because the governmental inter-
est at stake is undeniably legitimate.' 67
Thus, the economically viable use factor sheds no light on whether a
particular regulation has effected a taking. A taking may exist when a
property owner retains economically viable use; similarly, no taking may
be present even though a property owner has been totally deprived of
165. This, of course, raises the issue of what compensation is due under these circumstances.
Determination of compensation is a separate issue from identification of a taking, however, an action
that is otherwise an impermissible taking or invalid exercise of the police power is not rendered
constitutional merely because damages are small or difficult to evaluate. In Loretto, for example, the
Court found that the physical intrusion caused by the installation of cable television equipment no
"bigger than a bread box" 458 U.S. 419, 438 n.16 (1982), resulted in a taking, even though the
damages were extremely small. The property owner had contended that her loss should be measured
in terms of a percentage of the gross revenues received by the television company from her building,
Id. at 443 (Blackmun, L, dissenting). A state agency determined that her loss was measured by the
damage to her building, and assessed a one-time payment of one dollar. Id. at 423-24. The Supreme
Court did not address the damage issue, but remanded it to the state courts, which upheld the award
of one dollar. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428 (N.Y. 1983).
166. See, e.g., William W. Fisher II, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1393, 1403
(1993).
167. Moreover, the regulation substantially furthers that legitimate purpose, and the government's
interest in the regulation outweighs the burden placed on the property owner. See infra note 236 and
accompanying text (discussing test for determining validity of police power action).
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economically viable use of his or her property. The Supreme Court has
implicitly recognized this fact. In the few cases in which the Court has
struck down a regulation as an invalid taking, the holdings have often
been based upon determinations that the regulations did not properly
further a legitimate state interest.1 68  Even in Lucas, the Court did not
actually hold that the deprivation of all economically v:lable use inevita-
bly leads to a taking; rather, the majority found that total deprivation of
economically viable use was permitted when supported by underlying
principles of state law.'69 Retention or deprivation of economically
viable use is not a litmus test for regulatory takings.
c. Defining the Underlying Property Interest
The economically viable use test implicates the segmentation issue
raised by the investment-backed expectations test as discussed above.7
In earlier cases, the Supreme Court had suggested that in detennining
whether all economically viable use of property has been appropriated,
the "property" is the parcel as a single whole. The Court will not seg-
ment the property into different property interests in evaluating whether a
regulatory taking has occurred. 7'
In Lucas, Justice Scalia opened the door to further debate on this
issue. As he noted, a major failing of the deprivation of all economically
168. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 438 U.S. 825, 838-42 (1987) (striking down
a building permit condition requiring property owners to grant the public an easement across their
beach because the condition did not further a legitimate police-power purpose); Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704, 717-18 (1987) (holding that govemnental objective of consolidating Indian lands was
valid, but that the regulation that prevented the descent and devise even of non-fractionalized lands
did not further that goal).
169. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900-01 (1992). The Court had intimated in earlier cases as well that
confiscation of all use of property would generally constitute a taking, see, e.g., Williamson County
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985); MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1986), although it had also suggested that a taking
of all use would be allowed if contemplated by common law rules of nuisance. See First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,313 (1987) ("We... have no
occasion to decide whether the ordinance at issue actually denied appellant all use of its property or
whether the county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by
establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the State's authority to enact safety
regulations.") (footnote and citations omitted). See also United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc.,
344 U.S. 149 (1952) (finding no taking occurred where government destroyed oil company facilities
in the Philippines during World War H to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy);
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (finding no taking occurred where government destroyed
decorative cedar trees infected by a disease that threatened commercial apple trees).
170. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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viable use rule is that it does not indicate the "property interest" against
which the loss of value is to be measured. 72 If a regulation prohibits use
of 90% of a tract, should the burdened parcel be defined as the 90% of
the whole so burdened or as the entire parcel itself? The distinction is a
critical one because the per se rule laid down in Lucas applies only to
total takings, not to partial ones. A single regulation could give rise to
two different outcomes, depending upon how the segmentation issue is
resolved. If the regulation is interpreted as being a partial taking of the
entire parcel, no compensation would be mandated under Lucas. If the
regulation were interpreted as effecting a total taking of the burdened
portion, on the other hand, compensation would be required. The Lucas
Court found that it need not reach the issue because the regulation there
clearly effected a total deprivation of use of the entire parcel. Justice
Scalia thus left the issue unresolved, although he suggested that underly-
ing state law property principles would influence the outcome.'73
The prototypical case involves a partial taking, however; total takings
are rare. Thus, Lucas avoids the most pressing question regarding the
economically viable use test: what is the property interest against which
the loss of use is to be gauged?
172. 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
173. Id. ("The answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's reasonable
expectations have been shaped by the state's law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree the
state's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with
respect to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in--or elimination of-value.").
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia clearly saw a distinction between a regulation that takes all economically
beneficial uses of private property, and one that takes less than all, even if the taking approaches
totality. In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority's holding as being arbitrary, noting
that "[a] landowner whose property is diminished in value 95% recovers nothing, while an owner
whose property is diminished 100% recovers the land's full value." Id. at 2919 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). While Justice Scalia conceded this might well be true in some cases, he contended that
"that occasional result" was no different than the differing outcomes reached when a landowner's
property was taken for a highway (where recovery is full) and a landowner whose property value is
reduced to 5% by the construction of the highway (where no recovery is available). Id. at 2895 n.8.
In his words, "[t]akings law is full of these 'all-or-nothing' situations." Id.
As Epstein points out, Justice Scalia's analogy is faulty. It compares physical condemnation of
land, which "is a taking in the traditional sense of that term," to diminution in value caused by
construction of a highway elsewhere, which is "merely a form of competition against which no
landowner is ever entitled to compensation." Epstein, supra note 85, at 1376. In the first instance,
property has been taken and used by the government; in the second, no property interest has been
taken so the reduction in value is not constitutionally compensable. Id. Morebver, even if the
analogy were correct, Justice Scalia ought to explain why such all-or-nothing situations should be
tolerated. Their mere existence alone is not sufficient justification for their continued perpetuation.
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d. The "Personal/Real Property" Dichotomy
In Lucas, Justice Scalia indicated that property owners ought reason-
ably to expect that their personal property could be rendered economi-
cally valueless, 74 although he found that the "historical compact" memo-
rialized in the Takings Clause would prohibit the total elimination of
economically valuable use in land"5 Scholars are confounded by this
"naked assertion," for which Justice Scalia offered no external support.17 6
No previous Supreme Court decision had made such a bald distinction
between personal and real property. 77
The Lucas Court's observation apparently stems from its attempt to
reconcile its decision with the Court's unanimous decision in a 1979
opinion, Andrus v. Allard.171 In Andrus, the Court upheld a regulation
prohibiting commercial transactions in legally obtained bird parts (more
specifically, feathers of eagles and other protected birds). The regulation
severely limited the uses to which appellees could put the avian artifacts
that they owned and prohibited the sale of such artifacts.
174. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992) ("in the case of personal property," the property owner "ought
to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his property economically
worthless (at least if the property's only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for
sale)") (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979)). In Andrus, t e Court upheld a federal
regulation that prohibited commercial transactions in legally obtained bird parts. See infra notes
178-85 and accompanying text.
175. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 (footnote omitted). Justice Scalia did not explain the "historical
compact" that rendered these two classes of property subject to differing levels of constitutional
protection.
176. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on
Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 301,322-23 (1q93).
177. However, the real/personal property distinction drawn by Justice Scalia in Lucas was
foreshadowed in Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984), where the Court stated:
"[w]e have no occasion here to determine whether an abrogation of an owner's right to sell real
property, combined with a sufficiently substantial diminution of its utility to the owner, would give
rise to a taking." Id. at 15 n.25 (emphasis added).
178. 444 U.S. 51 (1979). Justice Scalia is apparently no fan of the Andmws decision (in which he
took no part as he had not yet joined the Court). In Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), for
example, Justice Scalia indicated in a concurrence that he found the statu:es at issue in Irving and
Andrus "indistinguishable" and that he would thus interpret the Irving decision as "effectively
limit[ing] [Andrus] to its facts." Id, at 719 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Andrus decision has proven
unsettling to other Justices as well. In his dissent in Keystone, Just e Rehnquist sought to
distinguish Andrus on the grounds that the government had not confiscated the aviap artifacts in that
case, nor had the government prohibited every use of the property. Keystor e Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 517 (1987) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
concluded that Andrus survived the takings challenge because the government had "merely
inhibitfed] one strand in the bundle," rather than "destroy[ing] completely any interest in a segment
of property." Id. at 518.
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In reaching its holding, the Andrus Court stated that a mere reduction
in property value alone does not create a taking.179 Although the reduc-
tion in value in Andrus was substantial, the Court found that the appel-
lees did retain some ability to derive an economic profit from the arti-
facts, suggesting that the appellees might charge admission to view the
bird parts. 80 The parts were not confiscated by the government, nor
were they subjected to restraint or physical invasion. 8' The Court con-
sidered the profit that the appellees might have expected to earn from the
sale of the artifacts had that sale not been rendered illegal too speculative
and uncertain to support a claim that a property interest had been
taken. 82
The Andrus Court cited in support of its holding two cases in which
bans on the sale of alcoholic beverages were upheld in the face of claims
that the regulations effected a taking as to those individuals who had
previously acquired stocks of alcohol that could not now be sold. 3
Those cases are distinguishable from Andrus. In the alcoholic beverages
cases, the government had made a legislative determination (whether
correct or not) that the sale and ingestion of alcoholic beverages had a
detrimental impact upon the public welfare. In order to prevent the
identified harm, no alcoholic beverages could be sold or drunk, whether
manufactured (or acquired) before or after the regulation was enacted.
The issue was one of identifying a public harm and undertaking a valid
police power action to counteract it. To the extent that the bans were
valid exercises of the police power, they did not effect a taking.
Andrus does not present the same clear issue of preventing a future
harm. The ban on the sale of bird parts from certain species was
intended to prevent the destruction of these species-an undeniably
legitimate legislative goal.'84 What is less clear is whether prohibiting
the sale of bird parts legally obtained prior to the ban furthered that
legislative objective of species protection, or whether the governmental
purpose might have been achieved through a less restrictive means, such
179. 444 U.S. at 66.
180. One is reminded of Justice Blackmun's suggestion in Lucas that the petitioner's property
was not rendered valueless because he could still "picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the
property in a movable trailer." 112 S. Ct. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181. 444 U.S. at 65.
182. Id. at 66.
183. See James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545 (1924); Jacob Ruppert, Inc. v. Caffey,
251 U.S. 264 (1920).
184. 444 U.S. at 52-53.
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as banning sales of future artifacts but permitting transactions in previ-
ously existing objects. 5
Although the Andrus Court acknowledged that the prohibition virtu-
ally eliminated the value of the appellees' property, it nonetheless denied
that a taking had occurred. That decision might well be correct, if indeed
the prohibition was necessary to promote the governmental goal. The
Andrus Court failed to address this critical question, however. More-
over, having said in Andrus that virtual destruction of economic value
will not necessarily lead to a taking, the Court found itself in a bind when
it wanted to hold in Lucas that a total destruction of economic value was
a per se taking. The Court adopted the real/personal property distinction
drawn by Justice Scalia as its way out of this conceptual dilemma. This
distinction is not only artificial, it is wrong. Either total destruction of
private property is constitutionally permissible or it is :aot; the Constitu-
tion draws no distinction between the natures of the underlying property
interests.186
II. RESURRECTING THE CORRECT FRAMEWORK FOR
TAKINGS ANALYSIS
Over the past sixteen years, the Supreme Court has increasingly
committed itself to a regulatory takings analysis that focuses extensively,
if not exclusively, upon the economic effects of the regulation upon the
property owner. The Court has ignored the difficulties associated with
the investment-backed expectations and economically viable use tests.
Although the regulatory takings issue is by no means subject to facile
resolution, neither is it completely intractable. If we; sweep aside the
economic tests, and all of their congenital defects, the solution becomes
apparent. Regulatory takings analysis does not require new theories.
Existing police power and eminent domain theories, properly revived and
185. One could, perhaps, argue that the continued sale of legally obtained parts would undermine
the protection extended to those species under the new act, but the argument seems attenuated.
186. In addition, juxtaposing the Irving and Andrus cases raises an interesting question. The
Andrus Court held that the regulated bird parts had not been taken because the owners retained the
rights "to possess and transport their property, and to donate or devise the protected birds." 444 U.S.
at 66. The Irving Court, on the other hand, seemed to suggest that donated or devised property was
not deserving of constitutional protection because it was not supported by investment-backed
expectations. 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987). Does this mean that the government could confiscate
personal property without compensation through a two-step process-by first regulating away all but
the right to donate or devise the property on the grounds that some incidenis of ownership had been
left to the owner, and then by confiscating the property once it had changed hands on the ground that
the new owner had no investment-backed expectations in the property? Such a result would be
ludicrous, yet a literal reading of the two opinions would seem to support it.
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carefully reconstructed, provide the tools for correct resolution of regula-
tory takings cases.
A. Rejection of the Economic Tests
In Penn Central and its early progeny, the Supreme Court used the
investment-backed expectations and economically viable use tests as
ways to measure whether a particular regulation was merely a constitu-
tionally compensable taking in disguise. Instead of providing workable
standards for gauging regulatory takings, however, the tests moved the
Court ever closer to inappropriate determinations.
As discussed above,'87 the economic tests provide no answers to the
more difficult analytic issues raised by regulatory takings. The segmen-
tation problem 88 persists under these tests; no rational rule can be created
for the vast majority of takings cases until that issue is resolved. In addi-
tion, both tests turn on the notion of the property owner's investment:
neither economically viable uses nor investment-backed expectations can
be gauged except in reference to some underlying base value. 8 9 Because
no clearly identifiable base value exists, application of both tests is sus-
pect. Finally, the tests can lead to inconsistent treatment of property
owners. The tests potentially apply in different manners to different per-
sons, depending upon the nature of their property (i.e., whether real or
personal), 9° the manner in which they acquired the property, 9' or the
time at which they acquired it.'92
More fundamentally, however, the economic tests fail because they
focus on the wrong inquiry. The Constitution mandates compensation
for the taking of property interests, not for the infliction of negative eco-
nomic impacts.93 True, the deprivation of an economic interest may well
signal the taking of a protected property right. However, no one-to-one
equivalency exists here. Not all economic interests are protected prop-
187. See supra part I.
188. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 124-29, 150-58 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 174-86 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
193. As Justice Brennan wrote: "Suffice it to say that government regulation-by
definition-involves the adjustment of rights for the public good. Often this adjustment curtails
some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. To require compensation in
all such circumstances would effectively compel the government to regulate by purchase." Andrus
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
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erty rights.'94 For example, the government may rescind a government-
issued permit without paying compensation, even though that permit
might trade in the private marketplace for value.'95 Likewise, unilateral
expectations of economic value or use by the property owner do not rise
to the level of constitutionally protected private property rights.
96
In addition, not all protected property rights have noticeable economic
value. Because their value is not easily measured in monetary terms,
these interests often receive short shrift from the Court. In Lucas, for
example, Justice Scalia noted that "there are plainly a number of non-
economic interests in land whose impairment will invite exceedingly
close scrutiny under the Takings Clause."'97  Although Justice Scalia's
statement is absolutely correct, it obscures the more important point:
those noneconomic interests to which he refers are property rights and
ought to be addressed as such.
As Justice Stevens has noted, the Constitution "draws no distinction
between grand larceny and petty larceny."" 9 ' Regulations may easily
deprive owners of incidents of their property ownership which, while of
minimal or no economic value, are nonetheless very real confiscations. 99
The lack of economic impact goes to the measure of damages, not to the
determination of the taking.2"
By failing to recognize that noneconomic property rights are indeed
property interests entitled to the same protection as economic property
interests, the Court finds itself venturing down incorrect analytical paths.
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,2"' for example, the Court held
194. The Supreme Court has used circular language to explain this proposition: "[Niot all
economic interests are 'property rights'; only those economic advantages ar.- 'rights' which have the
law back of them, and only when they are so recognized may courts compal others to forbear from
interfering with them or to compensate for their invasion." United States v. Willow River Power
Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945). This is the same circular argument discussed and dismissed
earlier. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
195. See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 488-89 (1973).
196. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
197. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 (1992). Justice Scalia went on to note that the interest in excluding
strangers from one's land is just such an interest, citing Loretto. Id.
198. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 727 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).
199. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Lucas, a regulation which "arbitrarily prohibit[ed
an owner from continuing to use her property for bird-watching or sunbathing" could well be a
taking even though the use might have little market value. 112 S. Ct. at 2919 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
200. Thus, for example, the property owner in Loretto received "just compensation" of one dollar
for the taking that she suffered. See supra note 165.
201. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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that the property interests of shopping center owners were not taken by a
state court's determination that the state constitution protecting free
speech forbade the owners from banning solicitors from their premises.
The PruneYard Court acknowledged that "one of the essential sticks in
the bundle of property rights is the right to exclude others" and that that
right had been "take[n]. 2"' Nonetheless, the Court found that there was
no violation of the Takings Clause because there was no evidence that
requiring the owners to permit solicitation on their property would
"unreasonably impair the value or use of their property."20' 3 The Court
quite clearly regarded the showing of economic harm as an essential pre-
cursor to the finding of a taking.204  Because the Court found no
economic impact, it found no taking, and perforce, held the regulation
valid.
The PruneYard Court's analysis was both circular and simplistic. The
Court noted that "[ilt is ... well established that a State in the exercise of
its police power may adopt reasonable restrictions on private property so
long as the restrictions do not amount to a taking without just compensa-
tion or contravene any other federal constitutional provision." 5 It then
rejected the property owners' allegation that the requirement that the
shopping center permit solicitors "to exercise state-protected rights of
free expression and petition on shopping center property" was a taking,
finding that the requirement did not impair the economic value of the
property to the landowners.2"6 The Court did not inquire into the state
interest at stake or whether that interest could properly be pursued using
the police power. Ignoring these inquiries can lead to incorrect out-
comes. For example, suppose that the Court found no adverse economic
impact from a regulation requiring the shopping center owner to make
available its fountains for model boat races. The PruneYard analysis
suggests that such a finding would end the Court's inquiry into the valid-
ity of the regulation-a ludicrous result. Adverse economic impact,
202. Id. at 82.
203. Id. at 83.
204. Id. at 84. "[H]ere [the owners] have failed to demonstrate that the 'right to exclude others' is
so essential to the use or economic value of their property that the state-authorized limitation of it
amounted to a 'taking."' Id. One might wonder how such a showing would be made. Clearly, the
owners perceived that a loss of the right to ban solicitors harmed their interests, or they would not
have brought the suit. Moreover, as the Loretto Court implicitly recognized, the loss of the right to
exclude is a loss of a real, constitutionally protected property right, whether accompanied by an
economic harm or not. See supra note 165.
205. 447 U.s. at 81.
206. Id. at 83.
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while relevant to the takings issue, cannot be a mandatory element in
invalidating a regulation.
Moreover, there are clearly instances in which regulations effect a
taking even though there are economic interests at stake that have not
been destroyed. Because the economic impact on the property owner
falls short of precluding all use of the property, the Court can be led to
conclude wrongly that no taking exists. Penn Central is just such a case.
The facts there indicated that the challenged regulation had very little
impact on the historic and current uses of the Terminal. Indeed, the
property owners conceded that the regulation did not prevent them from
earning a reasonable return on their investment. °7 In effect, the Penn
Central Court stated that as long as the status quo regarding current use
was maintained, and as long as the owners received a "reasonable
return," the challenged regulations would not effect a taking. The Court
ignored the more fundamental questions, however, which were whether
the governmental objectives underlying the regulations were legitimate
and whether these objectives were accomplished through a valid exercise
of the police power.0 ' If, in fact, the regulation was based in the eminent
domain power, compensation was constitutionally mandated.2"
Finally, the economic tests ignore the fact that, under certain circum-
stances, valid regulations may indeed take all economically viable use or
destroy all reasonable investment-backed expectations. Where the gov-
ernmental interest at stake is sufficiently important and the action is
properly grounded in the police power, intrusion, even total intrusion,
upon the economic interests of the property owner is permissible. The
prototypical examples are regulations banning contraband, such as illegal
207. 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978).
208. As discussed below, the legitimacy of the regulatory purpose and the means used to achieve
it are the critical issues in determining whether a regulatory taking exists. See infra note 236 and
accompanying text. In order to determine whether the challenged regulatiors in Penn Central were
takings, we need to determine whether the pieservation of historic landmarks legitimately promotes
the public welfare, see infra note 236 and accompanying text, or whether such regulations are a
taking of private property for a public use, for which compensation must be paid. In fairness to the
Penn Central Court, that issue was not actually before it because the properly owners had conceded
that the city's goal of preserving historic landmarks was "an entirely permissible governmental goal"
and that the challenged regulations were an "appropriate means" of achieving that goal. 438 U.S. at
129.
209. The facts seem to suggest that the city may have viewed the regulation as being based in the
eminent domain power as the city had provided some compensation for the loss of the air rights in
the form of transferable development rights. Id. The owners conceded that these rights were
"valuable," id., but contended that the transferable development rights were insufficient as a
monetary matter to constitute just compensation. Id. at 136 n.33. The disseit would have remanded
for a factual determination on this issue. Id. at 151-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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drugs or alcohol. Suppose, for example, that the legislature determined
that the public safety risks posed by fireworks were so grave that the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of these products must be banned.
There is little doubt that the legislature could ban fireworks, just as it has
banned substances such as cocaine, heroin, and marijuana.1
Equally clearly, the legislation will have a substantial and negative
impact upon investment-backed expectations and economically viable
uses. Imagine, for example, A, a distributor with a warehouse full of
cases of fireworks. As a result of the legislative ban, A's inventory is
now rendered worthless. Prior to the legislation, A clearly had an expec-
tation that he had a protected property interest in those fireworks. His
expectation was undeniably backed by the monetary investment he made
in purchasing the fireworks from the manufacturer for resale. Nonethe-
less, any arguments by A that the government should be required to pay
just compensation for the now worthless fireworks will fail.
The result cannot be explained away by Justice Scalia's contention
that personal property (such as fireworks) receives less constitutional
protection than real property. Imagine, for example, B, a fireworks
manufacturer with a factory designed and devoted exclusively to the
manufacture of these now forbidden items. Her factory is rendered use-
less, and thus worthless, by the ban. Although B presumably could tear
down the factory, or modify it for other use, it is not unlikely that the
costs of doing so would exceed the value of the underlying real property.
Suppose the factory and land, the day prior to regulation, had a market
value of $1 million. If the underlying land is valued at $300,000, and the
costs of demolishing or modifying the building are $500,000, it is easy to
see that B has lost all economically viable use of the property. Yet,
again, it is unlikely that courts would find that B had suffered a compen-
sable taking.
The Supreme Court has upheld total destruction of property in a num-
ber of cases. In Miller v. Schoene,21 for example, the Court permitted
the destruction without compensation of privately owned red cedar trees
in order to prevent them from spreading disease to nearby apple trees.
Likewise, in United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc.,212 the Court
permitted the destruction without compensation of property by the Army
in an effort to prevent the property from being seized by enemy forces.
210. Legislation banning contraband falls within the bounds of a legitimate exercise of the police
power. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
211. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
212. 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
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The key to each of these cases lies not in the economic effect upon the
property owner (which was undeniably complete in its devastation), but
in the importance of the governmental objective underlying the govern-
mental action, in the close relationship between that governmental objec-
tive and the challenged act, and in the nature of the power being exer-
cised.
The economic tests turn regulatory takings jurisprudence on its head
by focusing primarily, if not exclusively, on the economic effects of the
challenged action upon the individual property owner. While this issue
may be of some relevance in analyzing a takings claira, the important
issue, as discussed in the next section, is the legitimacy of the govern-
mental objective at stake and the character of the governmental action
taken in pursuit of that goal.
B. Towards a Correct Framework for Takings Analysis
1. Traditional Analysis and the Regulatory Takings Continuum
If we are to clear away the debris created by the economic tests, we
must address the critical question: how should regulatory takings claims
be resolved? The answer to this question does not require the formula-
tion of radical new takings theories. The building blocks of a coherent
and correct takings theory already exist; they simply need to be resur-
rected and reassembled in the proper fashion.
Recent regulatory takings law has viewed exercises of the police
power and the eminent domain power as anchoring opposite ends of a
continuum' 13 As a police power act moves closer and closer to some
213. This concept is grounded in Justice Holmes' opinion in Mahon, where he stated: "When
[regulation] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act" 260 U.S. 393, 413 ('1922). Originally, the
continuum notion did not exist. See William B. Stoebuck, Police Power, TaAings, and Due Process,
37 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1057, 1069 (1980) ("Stated in their simplest, starkest forms, Mugler v.
Kansas and the numerous decisions following it stand for the proposition that no exercise of the
police power is a taking; police power is one thing; eminent domain another."). As Professor
Costonis pointed out, the police and eminent domain powers are, in certain ways, polar opposites:
Through the welfare principle, the police power deliberately envisages the redistribution of
utility, often in the form of recognized interests in real property, as a mcans of furthering the
community's "health, safety, morals, or general welfare.". . . The emaient domain power,
through its indemnity principle, cuts the other way: its charge is protection of the individual, not
the community, by making the individual whole in the wake of governmental acts that
redistribute his or her property rights to others.
Costonis, supra note 20, at 478 (footnotes cmitted). Twentieth-century leE.al doctrine has ignored
this distinction and has caused the powers to converge. Id. at 479.
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invisible line, it ceases to be a valid exercise of the police power and
becomes instead a "regulatory taking"--a back-door exercise of the emi-
nent domain power for which compensation is constitutionally mandated.
The mooring of the eminent domain end of the continuum is easy to
identify-the conventional physical taking of property. Traditional
analysis uses that familiar starting point and attempts to construct from it
a paradigm for determining when a regulation has substantially the same
effect as a physical taking and hence becomes a "regulatory taking." The
economic tests are the direct, and even natural, result of this effort.
Where no physical taking is present, the Court looks to see whether the
economic effect of the regulation upon the property owner has the practi-
cal effect of a physical taking.214 The investment-backed expectations
and economically viable uses tests thus act as proxies for physical tak-
ings in the regulatory setting.
Following the continuum analysis to its logical conclusion, Supreme
Court opinions predating Lucas suggested that a regulatory taking occurs
only when the physical occupation or economic tests were satisfied.
Indeed, these opinions suggested that if the tests are satisfied, a per se
taking exists. This, in fact, was precisely the result toward which many
commentators thought regulatory takings jurisprudence was headed. In
evaluating the impact of the three takings cases decided by the Supreme
Court in its 1987 term,215 Michelman summed up the state of takings
doctrine as follows:
Doctrine appears to be moving in the direction of resolution into a
series of categorical "either-ors": either (a) the regulation is cate-
gorically a taking of property because (i) it works a permanent
physical occupation (however practically trivial) of private property
by the government, or, perhaps, specifically undermines a "distinct
investment-backed expectation," or (ii) it totally eliminates the
property's economic value or "viability" to its nominal owner, or
(b) the regulation is categorically not a taking.216
The direction of doctrinal development was troublesome, for it ele-
vated the status of the extremely problematic economic tests to that of a
touchstone for regulatory takings. This was the abyss that Justice Scalia
214. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2894 (1993).
215. These cases, commonly known as the "Takings Trilogy," were Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987).
216. Michelman, supra note 25, at 1622.
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saw looming before the Court in Lucas, and his opinion in that case rep-
resents an imperfect but valiant effort to step back from the brink of
jurisprudential disaster. Although he was unwilling to forsake the eco-
nomic tests altogether,2"7 Justice Scalia recognized that the economic
interests of the property owner alone could not be permitted to determine
the validity of governmental regulation-hence, his explicit recognition
of the exception for complete deprivations permitted by "background"
principles of state nuisance law." 8
Unfortunately, the nuisance test only partially addresses one of the
problems associated with the economic tests. It recognizes that regula-
tions may be valid even though they leave no economically viable use to
the property owner. However, the nuisance test uses an inflexible his-
torical standard to define those instances; it does not allow for ongoing
development of rational principles for determining when such severe
burdens may be imposed upon property owners. In addition, the nui-
sance test does not address the difficulties in applying the economic tests
or their failure to address fundamental takings issues.219 Thus, the nui-
sance test is not a panacea for regulatory takings cases. Something more
is needed.
217. And indeed, as discussed infra note 236 and accompanying text, the economic tests do have
some limited role to play in takings analysis.
218. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 (discussed ,upra note 25 and accompanying text).
219. The nuisance test has been subjected to many criticisms, some of which carry little weight.
For example, commentators complain that if state nuisance law is used to gauge the existence of a
regulatory taking, federal takings law will quickly degenerate into fifty separate sets of rules,
depending upon the state in which the action originates. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 Yale
L.J. 1077, 1093 (1993) (stating that Lucas "is astonishing... because it makes takings analysis turn
on the various common-law precedents of the fifty states"). Federal takings law already is in this
position, however, as "property" interests themselves are defined by state, not federal, law. See
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U S. 74, 84 (1980) ("Nor as a gcmeral proposition is the
United States, as opposed to the several States, possessed of residual authority that enables it to
define 'property' in the first instance.'); Board of Regents of State Collegea v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972) ("Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitation. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law... ."). If the state law influence in the definition of property
rights has not yet rendered takings law intolerable, it is hard to see how the infusion of state nuisance
law will make the situation that much worse.
However, other criticisms are more substantial. For a discussion of those zriticisms, see infra note
225 and accompanying text (discussing similarities between nuisance analysis and the harm/benefit
test vilified by commentators and the Court). Professor Stoebuck pointed out that the "noxious-use"
test is "a false test of whether a taking has occurred. It is in fact a test of whether the regulatory
measure addresses a problem that the government might legitimately try to solve. That is, the test
actually focuses on whether the regulatory measure was lacking in substantive due process."
Stoebuck, supra note 213, at 1062.
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2. Resurrecting the Correct Regulatory Takings Analysis
The notion of a police power/eminent domain continuum is inherently
flawed. Under the continuum analysis, a governmental action can only
be classified in one of two ways. If the action does not cross the invis-
ible line to become an exercise of the eminent domain power requiring
compensation, it must be a valid exercise of the police power. Thus, the
continuum model obscures a very potent fact: an invalid exercise of the
police power is not necessarily an exercise of the eminent domain power
requiring compensation; rather, it may be an invalid regulation.220
Although the practical effect of invalidating a regulation may be much
the same as concluding that a regulation constitutes a regulatory tak-
ing,"' the analysis used to evaluate each differs in very important ways.
Incorrect classification of the governmental interest will lead to incorrect
analysis and, very likely, an incorrect outcome.
If the continuum model is abandoned, regulatory takings analysis falls
naturally into a bifurcated process. The first step is to determine the
nature of the power being exercised by the government. All legitimate
governmental actions that infringe upon private property rights must fall
under either the eminent domain power 2 or the police powerm-the
only two tools at the government's disposal when it is pursuing its legis-
lative goals. The second, and perhaps more important, step requires a
determination of the validity of the exercise of the implicated power.
This two-step analysis provides the flexibility needed to reconcile appar-
ent inconsistencies in takings outcomes.
In drawing the distinction between exercises of the police power and
exercises of the eminent domain power, the Court traditionally has used
the harm/benefit test. Governmental actions intended to confer benefits
are exercises of the eminent domain power; governmental actions
220. Cf Stoebuck, supra note 213, at 1061 (stating that even though an exercise of the police
power is not a taking, it may be "void as lacking substantive due process"); John J. Costonis, The
Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 402, 405
(1977) (suggesting that enactments exceeding the police power are invalid regulations, not takings).
221. Although a full analysis of the remedy issue is beyond the scope of this article, I would argue
that the remedies for a regulatory taking and an invalid regulation are not identical. The former
requires payment of just compensation for property "taken." Invalid regulations do not "take"
property. Thus, the remedy for such invalid governmental actions ought to be nullification of the
regulation and payment of damages to the property owner for injuries actually incurred as a result of
the invalid act.
222. See supra note 1.
223. See supra note 15.
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intended to prevent harm are exercises of the police power." Under
traditional regulatory takings analysis, the harm/benefit distinction is
seen as the separating line between exercises of the eminent domain
power and the police power. The inquiry is treated as an all-or-nothing
one: if a regulation confers a benefit, it is an exercise of the eminent
domain power for which compensation is constitutionally mandated. If a
regulation prevents a harm, it is a presumptively valid exercise of the
police power for which no compensation is required. No middle ground
exists-there is no way of finding that a regulation does indeed prevent a
harm but is nonetheless invalid.
In recent years, the harm/benefit distinction has been vilified by courts
and commentators alike as being unmanageable and difficult to apply.'
224. See supra notes 15-16.
225. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2397-98 (1992); Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1892,
1933-35 (1992); Alfred P. Levitt, Comment, Taking on a New Direction: The Rehnquist-Scalia
Approach to Regulatory Takings, 66 Temple L. Rev. 197, 204 (1993). The.- harm/benefit rule of
Mugler co-exists uneasily at best with the economic tests of Mahon. The Court appears to have
developed the economic tests, at least in part, to avoid the close determinations required by the
harm/benefit test. The Court has issued conflicting pronouncements regarding these two tests, often
in a single opinion. In Keystone, for example, the Court noted that "a State need not provide
compensation when it diminishes or destroys the value of property by. . . abatng a public nuisance,"
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,492 n.22 (1987), and found that the
state law at issue there was passed to arrest a threat to the "common welfare," id. at 485. The Court
then went on to hold that the diminution in value of the property at issue was insufficient to support
a taking claim, id. at 496-502-a point utterly irrelevant if the Court were correct on the first in its
nuisance analysis.
The "solution" to the harm/benefit "problem" proposed by Justice Scalia ndses the same types of
issues, however. Justice Scalia turned to "background" principles of state nui3ance law to determine
when a regulation that denies all economically viable use would constitute a tddng. And, in its most
basic form, nuisance law does provide a rough-and-ready proxy for the difficult harm/benefit
distinction.
As Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent in Lucas, however, in determiring what constitutes a
nuisance under common law, state courts engage in precisely the same type of harm/benefit analysis
that the majority found inappropriate: "Common-law public and private nuisance law is simply a
determination whether a particular use causes harm." 112 S. Ct. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The determination must be made at some level, either by the courts or by the legislature. There
seems to be no good reason why the latter body should be excluded from participating in the
determination.
In response to Justice Blackmun's criticism that this reliance on the ba-kground principles of
nuisance law was just as subject to manipulation as the harm/benefit distinction rejected by the
majority, Justice Scalia stated: "[A]n affirmative decree eliminating all econcmically beneficial uses
may be defended only if an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents would exclude
those beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the land is presently found" Id. at 2902 n.18. In
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 114 S. Ct. 1332, 1334 (1994) (cert denied, Scalia, J., dissenting),
Justice Scalia again emphasized that states may not avoid takings "by invoking nonexistent rules of
state substantive law," stating that "[o]ur opinion in Lucas ... would be a nullity if anything that a
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In Lucas, Justice Scalia rejected the harm/benefit distinction because of
the uncertainties associated with it, 6 not least of which is the inherent
malleability of the rule. As Justice Scalia noted, drawing the line
between preventing a public harm and promoting the public good is often
difficult"2 7 In Lucas, for example, the regulation at issue could be char-
acterized as either protecting the environment from the "harm" caused by
building in a coastal zone or, alternatively, as providing for the "benefit"
of an ecological preserve. Justice Scalia was clearly concerned that the
legislature's characterization of the regulation as "harm-preventing"
alone not control, as the validity of the regulation would thus depend
upon a rote recitation by the legislature as to the remedial purpose of the
regulation."
The bifurcated analysis reduces the stakes in the harm/benefit game.
A finding that a regulation is intended to prevent harm will not end the
inquiry. It will merely aid in framing the analysis of the validity of the
action: should the regulation be evaluated as an exercise of the police
power or as an exercise of the eminent domain power? Moreover, criti-
cism of the harm/benefit analysis is premised upon another all-or-nothing
assumption that an action that conveys a benefit rather than preventing a
harm is necessarily grounded in the eminent domain power. In fact,
while all eminent domain actions convey benefits, some exercises of the
police power may also be viewed as conveying benefits, such as zoning
ordinances and similar measures that result in reciprocal benefits. For
example, a requirement that all development within a municipality
adhere to certain set-back restrictions may be based solely in aesthetics
rather than in considerations of public health, safety, and welfare.
Nonetheless, such a requirement may well be viewed as a valid exercise
State court chooses to denominate 'background law'-regardless of whether it is really such-could
eliminate property rights." Implicit in Justice Scalia's statements is a belief that the courts are more
likely to be objective than the legislatures in the area of defining nuisances.
226. Interestingly, in a dissent in a 1988 case, Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988),
Justice Scalia had argued that if "there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the property use
restricted by [a] regulation and the social evil that the regulation seeks to remedy," no regulatory
taking occurs. Id. at 20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia went on
to state: "Since the owner's use of the property is (or, but for the regulation, would be) the source of
the social problem, it cannot be said that he has been singled out unfairly." Id.
227. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897-98 (noting that "the distinction between 'harm-preventing' and
'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the beholder").
228. As Justice Scalia rather acidly put it, "Since such a justification can be formulated in
practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff." Id. at 2898
n.12.
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of the police power because it conveys reciprocal benefits to all burdened
property owners.229
The harm/benefit rule is helpful in drawing the line between exercises
of the police power and the eminent domain power. The inquiry does
229. The Supreme Court typically has upheld regulations that afford "an average reciprocity of
advantage" to property owners affected by the regulation. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 415 (1922). As Justice Rehnquist explained in his dissent in Penn Central:
Typical zoning restrictions may... so limit the prospective uses of a piece of property as to
diminish the value of that property in the abstract because it may not be used for the forbidden
purposes. But any such abstract decrease in value will more than likely be at least partially
offset by an increase in value which flows from similar restrictions as to tse on neighboring
properties. All property owners in a designated area are placed under the same restrictions, not
only for the benefit of the municipality as a whole but also for the common benefit of one
another.
438 U.S. 104, 139-40 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Likewise, historic pn-.servation ordinances
that cover all of a specific area confer benefits upon the public as a whole (preservation of historic
buildings and sites). Although each regulated landowner incurs a burden as a result of the
regulation, each receives a benefit as well-the maintenance of a historically significant area, which
presumably enhances the stability of the area and protects property values. Owner A may be
burdened by the fact that he is unable to alter his historic home, but he is benefited by the fact that
his neighbors are likewise prohibited from altering the character of the neighborhood. Contrast this
scenario with the landmark regulation at issue in Penn Central There, isolated property owners
were singled out for regulation while their neighbors were not subject to such restrictions. In such
an instance, it is more difficult to maintain that the property owner ought t, bear the burden of
regulation clearly intended to preserve aesthetic values for the public as a whole. If preservation of a
landmark is a worthy public goal, it should be pursued through compensatory means, such as tax
credits for rehabilitation and conservation easements, or directly through condemnation.
In a recent article, Professor Jed Rubenfeld proposed a "usings" theory of erainent domain, which
may be helpful in identifying the subset of benefit-conveying actions that are grounded in the
eminent domain power. See Rubenfeld, supra note 219, at 1080 ("when government conscripts
someone's property for state use, then it must pay"). He suggested that the distinction between a
compensable taking and a noncompensable exercise of the police power must lie in the distinction
between taking private property for public use and a regulation which, while it regulates property,
does not actually confiscate it for public use. Thus, in "contraband" cases, ;uch as the fireworks
scenario presented above, see supra note 210 and accompanying text, the government is confiscating
the property to destroy it, it is not taking the property to use it (e.g., to distribute to cities for
Independence Day celebrations). Rubenfeld, supra note 219, at 1151-52. Rabenfeld provides the
example of a car impounded by the police because they suspect that it is a stolen vehicle. Id. at
1115. He argues that as long as the car is merely impounded and not used by the state for
transportation or other purposes, no taking has occurred because the car is rot being subjected to
"public use." Rubenfeld's analysis should extnd further, however, to an eva uation of whether the
impounding survives a police power challenge. See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
Professor Sax offered a theory similar to Rubenfeld's in a 1964 article, in which he stated:
The rule proposed here is that when economic loss is incurred as a result of government
enhancement of its resource position in its enterprise capacity, then compensation is
constitutionally required . . . .But losses, however severe, incurred as a consequence of
government acting merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed as a non-compensable
exercise of the police power.
Sax, supra note 15, at 63.
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not stop there, however. Not all exercises of the eminent domain or
police power are automatically legitimate. Rather, there is a critical sec-
ond step to the analysis, which distinguishes between valid and invalid
exercises of those powers."
An exercise of the eminent domain power involves the "taking" of
private property for "public use;' 2" "just compensation" must be pro-
vided for the taking. 2 Subject to these strictures, however, the govern-
ment is always permitted to achieve its legislative objectives through the
exercise of this power.
Under the police power, the government is permitted to intrude upon
private property interests, provided such infringements are needed to
prevent injury to the health, safety, or general welfare of the commu-
nity. 3  If the test is satisfied, no compensation is required.z 4 In Lawton
230. Rubenfeld hints at this distinction when he notes that immediately preceding the
Compensation Clause is the Due Process Clause, which "expressly deal[s] with deprivations of
property." Rubenfeld, supra note 219, at 1119 (italics in original).
231. See U.S. Const. amend. V (quoted supra note 1). The Court has read the public use
restriction so narrowly in recent years, see Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41
(1984) (stating that the 'public use' requirement is... coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's
police powers" and that the exercise of the eminent domain power must be upheld if it is "rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose'), that it is generally viewed as having little, if any,
restraining effect upon the exercise of the eminent domain power. See generally Lynda J. Oswald,
Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging Factors in the Just Compensation Equation, 32 B.C.
L. Rev. 283, 295 (1991); Rubenfeld, supra note 219, at 1078-79; Comment, The Public Use
Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 Yale L.J. 599 (1949).
232. See U.S. Const. amend. V (quoted supra note 1).
233. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887). In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court
upheld regulations that imposed severe economic costs upon property owners on the grounds that
they were necessary to prevent a public harm. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
234. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669, where the court stated:
The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will
be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not-and, consistently with
the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be-burdened with the condition that the
State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason
of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the
community.
In Mugler, Justice Harlan reasoned that the government has the power to require each citizen to use
his or her property in a manner that does not injure the public. Id. at 660 (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113, 124 (1876)). Of course, the power to define that injurious behavior "must exist
somewhere," and Justice Harlan concluded that that "somewhere" is in the legislature. Id. at
660-61. See also Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932) (finding that "debatable questions as
to reasonableness are not for the courts but for the legislature"). As the Keystone Court phrased it,
"since no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm
others, the State has not 'taken' anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like
activity." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 (1987). The
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v. Steele, decided in 1894, the Supreme Court set forth a means-end test
for evaluating police power actions: in assessing the validity of a police
power action, the Court must determine: "first, that the interests of the
public ...require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals." ' 5
Thus, police power actions require the following substantive due
process analysis: (1) is the governmental interest at stake legitimate; (2)
if so, is the relationship between the regulatory means chosen and the
governmental interest reasonably close; and (3) if so, does the govern-
mental interest at stake outweigh the burden the regulation inflicts on the
property owner?236 Note that the economic tests may well play a role in
answering the last inquiry. The distinction is that the tests, in this con-
text, are but one factor to consider; they do not present the Court with the
all-or-nothing choice currently found in takings jurisprudence. The eco-
Latin maxim "sic utere tuo et alienum non Iaedes" ("use what is yours sD that others are not
injured") has been implicitly, if not explicitly, embraced by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Mugler,
123 U.S. at 665 ("[AII property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's
use of it shall not be injurious to the community.) (citing Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S.
25,32 (1877)).
A regulation designed to prevent harm by prohibiting a harmful use in advance makes more social
and economic sense than providing compensation to the injured parties through a nuisance suit for
damages after the harm has occurred. Moreover, in instances in which the harm is more
diffuse-e.g., damage to a regional ecosystem because of development in a wetlands-it may be
difficult to identify a plaintiff who is both willing and able to bring a private nuisance suit; in
addition, the government may be unwilling to press a public nuisance suit, anl so the harm may go
uncontrolled and unremedied. In such an instance, regulation is the most logical and efficient means
of preventing harm. Indeed, these are precisely the rationales commonly provided to explain the
growth in environmental regulation over the past two decades. See Nancy I. Kubasek,
Environmental Law 90-91 (1994).
235. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
236. The Supreme Court has recognized this test, although it has often conised the terminology.
The Penn Central Court, for example, stated that "a use restriction... may constitute a 'taking' if
not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose." Penn Cent Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). In 1987, the Supreme Court determined in the
context of an exactions case that the government must demonstrate a "nexus" between the specific
governmental restriction at issue and the purported governmental objective. Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). The Nollan Court indicated that conditions "reasonably
related to the public need or burden" created by the regulated activity would not give rise to a taking.
Id. at 838. Because the Court found that the nexus between the condition and the burden in Nollan
failed "even the most untailored standards," it did not definitively state what type of relationship is
required. Id. The Nollan Court indicated in dicta that a relationship stronger than that contemplated
by the rational basis test of due process or equal protection was required. Id. at 834 n.3.
In its 1994 decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct 2309 (1994), the Court reexamined this
question of the required nexus. It determined that "[n]o precise mathematical calculation is
required" but that a "rough proportionality," as evidenced by "some ,,ort of individualized
determination," is necessary. Id. at 2319.
Cornering the Quark: Takings Analysis
nomic tests should not be dealt a fatal blow, but neither should they be
permitted to dictate the outcome of takings claims.
Obviously, this analysis is not new,"' nor has it been completely
ignored in regulatory takings jurisprudence. In Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,"s for example, the Supreme Court struck down an
act of the California Coastal Commission conditioning the issuance of a
development permit upon the property owners granting the public a
right-of-way across their private beach. While the Court accepted the
Commission's assertion of a proper state interest (in providing access to
public beaches), it found that the Commission's act did not promote that
interest and was, in fact, an extortive attempt to gain a public right-of-
way without paying for it. 9 The lack of a means-end fit invalidated the
regulation.
The Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard2 4° even
more explicitly revives the police power analysis.2"' The Dolan Court
found that the city had articulated legitimate governmental interests in
preventing flooding and reducing traffic congestion.242 The Court also
agreed that a nexus existed between those objectives and the city's
attempt to condition a building permit upon the property owner's agree-
ing not to build in the floodplain and to construct a bicycle/pedestrian
path.243 However, the relationship between the city's objectives and the
exactions it sought to extract from the property owner was not suffi-
237. See generally James L. Oakes, "Property Rights" In Constitutional Analysis Today, 56
Wash. L. Rev. 583 (1981) (discussing the rise and decline of substantive due process in
constitutional analysis).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), is generally regarded as the high point of the Supreme
Court's excursion into substantive due process analysis. The Court there stated:
The mere assertion that the subject relates though but in a remote degree to the public health
does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation, as a
means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held
to be valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in
his power to contract in relation to his own labor.
198 U.S. at 57-58. As Judge Oakes states, "the established doctrine has been that substantive due
process came to a dead end with the New Deal Court, commencing with West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish. [300 U.S. 379 (1937)]." Oakes, supra, at 592-53.
238. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
239. Id. at 837.
240. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
241. In fact, the Dolan dissent criticized the majority's opinion as a revival of substantive due
process. See id. at 2327 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 2317-18.
243. Id. at 2318.
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ciently close.2' Although the city might legitimately prohibit the owner
from building in the floodplain, its attempt to require the owner to dedi-
cate the space as a public greenway was impermissible.24 Moreover, the
city's failure to quantify its findings that a pathway would offset
increased traffic congestion was fatal.246
Police power analysis has not received the amount of judicial or
scholarly attention that it deserves in recent years247 despite calls for a
re-examination of the doctrine by some commentators.14' As the next
subsection illustrates, explicit revival of the police power analysis would
provide workable, predictable solutions to many, if not all, regulatory
takings issues.
244. Id. at 2320-21.
245. Id. at 2321.
246. Id. at 2322.
247. As Professor Stoebuck has pointed out, "[c]onfusion over the proper role of substantive due
process and over the relationship between due process and takings is a pervasive problem in judicial
decisions and in scholarly writing." Stoebuck, supra note 213, at 1081. A faw commentators have
examined the relationship between substantive due process analysis and takings jurisprudence in
recent years, not always favorably. See, e.g., Glen E. Summers, Note, Private Property Without
Lochner: Toward a Takings Jurisprudence Uncorrupted by Substantive Due Process, 142 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 837 (1993); C. Kevin Kelso, Substantive Due Process as a Limit on Police Power Regulatory
Takings, 20 Willamette L. Rev. 1 (1984); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Legal Discourse, Social Vision
and the Supreme Court's Land Use Planning Law: The Genealogy of the Lochnerian Recurrence in
First English Lutheran and Nollan, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 427 (1988); Patrick C. McGinley,
Regulatory "Takings": The Remarkable Resurrection of Economic Substantive Due Process
Analysis in Constitutional Law, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,369 (1987); J. Freitag, Note,
Takings, 1992: Scalia 's Jurisprudence and a Fifth Amendment Doctrine to Avoid Lochner Redivivus,
28 Val. U. L. Rev. 743 (1994). A number of" scholars have re-examined substantive due process in
recent years and urge its revitalization in various contexts. See, e.g., Norman Karlin, Substantive
Due Process: A Doctrine for Regulatory Control, 13 Sw. U. L. Rev. 479 (1983); Michael J. Perry,
Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cares, 71 Nw. U. L. Rev.
417 (1976); Bernard H. Siegan, Rehabilitating Lochner, 22 San Diego L. Rev. 453 (1985); Mark
Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 261; Christopher T. Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Preservation of Competition, 11
Hastings Const. L.Q. 91 (1983).
248. For example, Judge Oakes, writing in 1981, inquired:
[If] "taking law" is insufficient to handle the complex matter of legislation affecting property,
should we-despite the supposed demise ofLochner-look back again to the due process clause
for protection of property rights in a substntive sense? After virtual judicial abdication, are we
coming full circle to substantive due process? Would this be bad in light of the chaotic state of
takings law?
Oakes, supra note 237, at 609.
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3. Applying the Police Power Analysis
The force of the police power analysis (and the failings of the eco-
nomic tests) are easily illustrated through a series of hypotheticals:
Hypothetical 1:
Assume that a residential subdivision of 25 lots is developed, the
lots are sold to individuals who intend to build single-family
homes, and six homes are actually built. Several sinkholes appear
in the area; one causes the partial collapse of a home. Geological
studies indicate a general instability in the area and a high prob-
ability that future sinkholes will appear without warning. The city
condemns the existing homes in the subdivision and prohibits the
issuance of building permits for the remaining lots. A, whose home
is undamaged by the existing sinkholes, and B, who owns a vacant
lot, challenge the city's actions.
Under the economic tests, both A and B have been deprived of all eco-
nomically viable use of their property. Both, and most especially A, who
has completed his home, have reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions with which the city has interfered. Application solely of the eco-
nomic tests would provide A and B with a strong basis for their chal-
lenge.249
However, the city's actions will survive a police power analysis. The
actions are intended to eliminate a dangerous situation and advance pub-
lic safety. The city's actions protect residents of the subdivision, their
guests, service providers, and others who may be drawn to the area. The
proper analysis would view the governmental interest as legitimate and
249. This is not to argue that a court would not find a way to uphold the regulation, for
undoubtedly it would, but the court would do so in contravention of the results suggested by the
economic tests, illustrating the inability of the tests to cut across broad categories of regulatory
takings.
Justice Scalia provided a similar example in Lucas involving "a corporate owner of a nuclear
generating plant [who) is directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery that the
plant sits astride an earthquake fault" Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct 2886,
2900 (1992). Justice Scalia framed his solution in terms of "background principles" of state law:
Such regulatory action may well have the effect of eliminating the land's only economically
productive use, but it does not proscribe a productive use that was previously permissible under
relevant property and nuisance principles. The use of [this property] for what [is] now [an)
expressly prohibited purpose] was always unlawful, and (subject to other constitutional
limitations) it was open to the State at any point to make the implication of those background
principles of nuisance and property law explicit.
Id. at 2900-01.
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the relationship between the action taken and the governmental interest
as sufficiently close. Absent an economically feasible method of address-
ing the geological instability, the burden on the landowner could not be
said to outweigh the governmental interest, and the regulation would be
upheld.
Hypothetical 2:
Property owner A purchases the last remaining vacant lot along a
beach. All of the existing homes along both sides of the road are
two stories high. A city council member who lives directly across
the street from A's lot is displeased about the imminent loss of her
ocean view from her own two-story home. Hence, she persuades
the city to adopt a regulation imposing a height restriction on new
homes constructed in the area. The stated purpose of the regulation
is to preserve aesthetics and public views of the ocear. Under the
regulation, A can only build a one-story house.
In evaluating the impact on the property owner, the economic tests,
standing alone, would seem to suggest this regulation would be valid.
The property owner can still build a one-story house. Alhough its value
may be somewhat less than a two-story house built on the same lot, the
difference is unlikely to be so significant as to destroy ai "economically
viable use." Moreover, while A may have a reasonable investment-
backed expectation that she will be able to build a home, her inability to
build the precise type of home she desires will not interfere substantially
with her expectations.
Again, the economic tests lead to an incorrect outcome. The correct
starting point of the analysis should be the nature of the governmental
action. Unlike Hypothetical 1, there is no intent to eliminate a dangerous
condition or to otherwise directly promote the public health, safety, and
welfare. The regulation addresses aesthetics and therefore confers a
benefit. The benefits conferred are not reciprocal, as A is burdened by
the height restriction but her neighbors (all of whom have existing two-
story homes) are not. The governmental action thus cemnot be validly
grounded in the police power. The regulation, if valid, must be grounded
in an exercise of the eminent domain power, and if it is to continue,
compensation must be paid."
250. Even if analyzed under the eminent domain power, this regulation ought to be struck down
as seizing a benefit for private, rather than public, use. As Judge Oakes irquired, "does not the
'overregulation equals taking' syllogism, insofhr as it implies that the regu.ation is proper if the
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Hypothetical 3:
Assume the same facts as in Hypothetical 2, but this time the regu-
lation also contains recitals to the effect that the restriction is
needed to control erosion and avoid destructive wind patterns
created by two-story houses. However, the city has no scientific
evidence to support these recitals.
The change in facts highlights the criticism of the harm/benefit dis-
tinction made by Justice Scalia in Lucas. The governmental entity has
rephrased its legislative goal in terms of preventing a harm. Thus, under
the proposed analysis, the regulation should be analyzed as a police
power exercise because it purports to prevent harm to the public. The
purported purpose does not control the outcome, however. Although the
governmental interest at stake is undeniably legitimate (erosion control),
the regulation nonetheless fails because there is no evidence that the
regulation furthers that goal.2st Moreover, the regulation inflicts a sig-
nificant burden upon A, the land owner. Thus, the regulation must be
struck down. If the city wishes to achieve its purpose, it must exercise its
eminent domain power and compensate A for the property interest
taken. z2
Hypothetical 4:
A city adopts a wetlands ordinance preventing the filling of wet-
lands for development purposes and the construction of any build-
ing within 1,000 feet of a wetland. The ordinance is based on
findings, supported by scientific evidence, that wetlands perform
important ecosystem functions, including filtering of run-off and
control of flood waters. Five years before the ordinance was
enacted, A acquired a lot that is 90% covered by wetlands. Under
the ordinance, she will be unable to build on her lot. B's lot is only
property owner is compensated for the decline in value of his property, become a method in
ambiguous or gray-area cases of requiring the public to bear costs that are really private in nature?"
Oakes, supra note 237, at 608-09.
251. As the Mugler Court stated: "If... a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the
public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those
objects.... it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution."
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887). This scenario is analogous to the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), where the Court held that the
city's legislative goals of preventing floods and reducing traffic congestion were legitimate, but that
the city failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that its regulation furthered those goals.
252. Again, though, the exercise of the eminent domain power should not be allowed here
because the regulation confers benefits for private, not public use.
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20% covered by wetlands, and he acquired it after the ordinance
was passed. B will be able to build but the most desirable building
site is 600 feet from a wetland. Experts have de:ermined that
building within 600 feet of the wetlands will have no adverse
impact on the wetland if certain simple and inexpensive measures
regarding drainage and run-off are taken. A and B challenge the
wetland ordinance.
Under the traditional analysis, A will stand a better chance of having
the ordinance invalidated. She had a reasonable investment-backed
expectation that she would be able to build on her land; that expectation
and all economically viable uses of her land have been eliminated by the
ordinance."'
B's case is weaker under traditional analysis. B's investment-backed
expectations may not be reasonable because he purchased his lot after the
ordinance was passed. Moreover, B is able to build on his lot; his burden
is simply that he cannot build on his desired site.
The result reached under traditional analysis is unsatisfactory. First, if
the city has determined in a rational manner that the destruction of wet-
lands threatens the public safety and welfare, it is entitled to take meas-
ures to prevent that harm. The economic impact on A' is important; it
must be taken into account in determining if the governmental interest
justifies the burden placed on A or if the governmental interest could be
achieved in a less burdensome manner. However, the economic impact
on A should not control. On the other hand, B faces a burden that
appears unnecessary to accomplish the goal of the regulation. Thus,
while B's burden is less than that suffered by A, it should not be
imposed. Moreover, the fact that B acquired his land after the ordinance
was passed is irrelevant. B must take the rights of his predecessor; other-
wise, it is B's predecessor who has no redress for the burden imposed
upon him.
The correct analysis recognizes that the regulation is based in the
police power and balances the governmental interest against the burden
imposed on the property owners. Thus, if the burden imposed on A were
unavoidable and justified by the harm prevented, the regulation would be
valid as applied to A. Conversely, if the regulation were overbroad in its
application to B's situation, the regulation would be invalid as applied to
B.
253. While the city may be able to argue that A could be prevented f-om building under the
doctrine of common law nuisance, it is not clear that background principles of state law encompass
emerging understandings about integrated ecosystems and the importance of wetlands.
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I. CONCLUSION
Ever since Justice Holmes opened Pandora's box by declaring in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon254 that a regulation that "goes too far" is
a taking, 5 the United States Supreme Court has struggled to determine
where that line of "too far" should be drawn. The box needed to be
unsealed; Justice Holmes was undeniably correct in stating that a regula-
tion can just as easily effect a taking of property interests as can a physi-
cal confiscation. Nonetheless, the evils set loose upon the legal world by
Justice Holmes's action have proven devilishly hard to subdue.
The investment-backed expectations and economically viable use tests
inject unnecessary confusion into takings law. Instead of concentrating
upon the economic effect of the governmental action upon the individual
owner, the Court needs to refocus on the nature of the power being exer-
cised by the government. The distinction between exercises of the police
power and exercises of the eminent domain power needs to be revived
and the role of police power analysis re-examined.
The quark has been cornered; surely regulatory takings can be brought
to bay as well.
254. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
255. Id. at 415.

